

AN ASSESEMENT OF STATE AND NON STATE RESPONSES TO BOKO HARAM CRISIS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The new form of terrorism was consummated following the devastating attacks by Al Qaida against the military architecture of United States of America. The first counter terrorism strategy adopted by President George Bush was military approach which led to the declaration of total war against terrorism. This approach has become global approach with different countries adopting it through heavy deployment of military weapons to decimate the capacity of terrorists. However, President Good luck Jonathan derived inspiration from military approach in the war against Boko Haram. After the declaration of state of emergency there was heavy military presence in the North Eastern Nigeria with the intension of degrading the capacity of Boko Haram. There is no doubt that President Good luck Jonathan adopted counter terrorism strategies but the effectiveness of all the strategies adopted has become a subject of trepidation. The administration of President Good luck Jonathan was not only bedeviled by corruption but lacked clear direction in its war against Boko Haram. Also, the inability of his administration to effectively tackle Boko Haram eventually led to his fundamental electoral defeat in 2015 General Elections. The electioneering campaign of Mohammed Buhari was greeted with much euphoria because of his promise to tackle Boko Haram within six months of his administration. Remarkably, the present administration has made some progresses but victory has not been achieved. However, this study analyses the state and non state responses through the prism of counter terrorism strategies adopted since the beginning of Boko Haram crisis, the study adopts bibliographical method of data collection and descriptive method of data analysis with the recommendation that the war against Boko Haram cannot be completely won through the barrel of gun. The counter terrorism strategy should be combination of both orthodox and critical terrorism approaches.

Keywords: *Terrorism; Counter terrorism; Anti terrorism; Boko-Haram, North East*

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Boko Haram crisis has put the strength of both the affected communities in the North East and Nigeria on serious test over the years (Mohammed, 2016, p.10). The response of Nigerian state in handling Boko Haram crisis has reflected failure of governance in different aspects. As Mohammed (2016) pointed out, intelligence on Boko Haram was available to the Federal Government

for 14 years before the violent eruption in 2009. It was unfortunate that this was treated with Kid Gloves as it was deliberately not acted upon due to lack of political will to confront a seemingly religious issue. Political bickering that characterized the Boko Haram crisis between PDP and the opposition ruling party in Borno State was another careless testimony against Nigerian leadership. However, in the midst of controversy that characterized the eruption of Boko Haram crisis and coupled with poor state response, Boko Haram was able to gather momentum and eventually became the most deadly terrorist group in the world. The extra judicial killing and jungle justice meted on the leaders of Boko Haram who was a prominent member of Sharia Board under the first tenure of Ali Modu Sheriff has made some analysts to attribute the cause of Boko Haram crisis to weak leadership in the country. It will be recalled that Mohammed Yusuf and former Governor of Borno State were on the same page during his electioneering campaign before the strained relationship between the two parties which has also made some analysts to content that Boko Haram crisis was a transparent tactics aimed at concealing political and economic agendas in the core North. However, Boko Haram under the previous leadership cannot be compared with the current leadership under the auspices of Abubakar Shakau. The current leader has made Boko Haram to be more radical and brutal in all their activities. Also, Abubakar Shekau, was able to expand the tentacle of Boko Haram beyond the structure of the first leadership owing to the poor response of Nigerian state in handling the crisis.

However, since the beginning of unabated crisis, Nigerian government under President Jonathan was able to develop some frameworks to curtail the activities of Boko Harm in the North East but the effectiveness of all the frameworks have generated copious contending debates both in the extant literature and among the stakeholders. Surprisingly, despite different approaches employed by the previous administration to curtail the activities of Boko Haram, the group was able to grow in ranks and the level of operation was progressively high. It will be recalled that former President Jonathan declared state of Emergency in Nigeria on 15 May, 2013 without any reasonable impact on the security situation of the region. Also, federal government under the leadership of President Jonathan formally launched the New National Security Strategy and Cyber Security Plan and Strategy to combat terrorism in the country. It contains three different documents, National Security Strategy, Counter Terrorism Strategy and Cyber Security Plan and Strategy. However, the strategy was put in place to maintain the survival of nation through the use of economic power, diplomacy, military and political power. This strategy also mirrored National Terrorism Strategy, NACTEST which was organized around five work streams, each with its key objectives and success indicators within

the period of 2014 to 2016. Despite all the strategies adopted by President Goodluck Jonathan, Boko Haram became the most vicious organization under his watch.

CONTENDING ISSUES

Origin and Causes Of Boko Haram Crisis

The violent inauguration of Boko Haram was greeted with controversial views on what could have been responsible for the unabated crisis. Prior to this period the sect was established on the platform of religion with the intention of using religion as a defense to correct the abnormalities in Nigerian political terrain most especially the accumulated poverty occasioned by bad governance over the years bearing in mind the full implementation of Sharia law. It is a common doctrine among many supposedly Islamic fundamentalists' group and some moderate Muslims in Nigeria to demand for full implementation of Sharia law. Also, since the departure of the British in 1960, the controversial debates over the full implementation of sharia in Nigeria have produced a number of changes and continuities (Olabanji, 2015). Similarly, the political transformation from military autocracy and absolutism to civilian in 1999 gave room for local politicians, mainly in the northern Nigeria, basically to campaign for votes with the manifestos that Sharia law will be fully implemented after the election.

However, as observed by Adesoji (2017), the electioneering campaign during this period really garnered support by these electoral promises. In January 2000, Zamfara in the northwest Nigeria was the first state to fulfill this campaign promise. Zamfara state gave effect to the full implementation of Sharia penal code. In a similar vein, eleven states also followed the same direction with Zamfara by introducing Sharia law. However, it was discovered that introduction of Sharia law in the north was greeted with much euphoria in some parts of the north and crises in the major parts of the north. The crisis that followed the implementation of sharia law was orchestrated by two major factors (1) There was early assurance that Sharia law will not be applied to non Muslim except they consent but reverse was the case when it was implemented (2) The enforcement of Sharia law was majorly directed against poor and vulnerable people in the North while the elites in the north enjoyed unwritten immunity from enforcement latitude. More so, in the midst of disillusionment that trailed the implementation of Sharia law, it continues in twelve states in the north and this controversy has made some analysts to content that the introduction of Sharia law in 2000 was more political than religion and this lacuna sent signal to Boko Haram as a means to perpetrate all manner of evil in the name of religion (Omotola, 2016). However, Boko Haram's role in shaping the implementation of full sharia law in Borno state in the early 2000s snowballed into

local politics before it detached its association with the Borno state government in the late 2000s.

Meanwhile, the precise date of Boko Haram is shrouded in controversy especially if someone rely on media account (Onuoha, 2011). This study observed that exact date of Boko Haram's establishment is clearly unclear but many observers traced the origin to early 2000s when Mohammed Yusuf became a leader. Also, at the inception of Boko Haram, it appears as a religious organization until 2009 when it assumed a notorious dimension after the extra judicial killing of their leader. The radicalization of Boko Haram goes beyond jungle justice exercised on their leaders simply because the new leader of Boko Haram Shekau had always been radical prior 2009 crisis (Omotola, 2017). Contrary to the submissions of Omotola and, the radical approach by Boko Haram was not unconnected with extra judicial killing of their leader and poor state response. Also, the electioneering campaign in Borno State in 2003 also played a major role in understanding the causes of Boko Haram, it was also on record that , in the build up to 2003 general elections, the Boko Haram support enjoyed by Ali Modu Sheriff, who was then a gubernatorial aspirant was widely believed to have enhanced Sheriff's victory at the 2003 election with eventually made him the executive governor of Borno state between 2003 and 2007 following his reelection for a second time of four years in 2007, he was the governor till 2011.

However, Boko Haram did not support Sheriff who was desperate to win gubernatorial election without some agreements and promises between the two parties. It was that agreement that conditioned him to appoint Alhaji Foi as commissioner for religion affairs while Yusuf was made a member of the Borno State Sharia Board, a board responsible for supervising for implementation of full Sharia in the state. However, the strained relationship between the two parties explains the violent character of Boko Haram in some quarters (Onuaha, 2017). Similarly, some people were of the opinion that Yusuf fell out with his local political allies because of the manner the Sharia law was implemented in the state as Adesoji Aderemi laments

The role of partisan politics and political patronage in the sustenance of Boko Haram sect is obvious. It would appear that the introduction of Sharia in some northern states beginning in 1999 encouraged some closeness between Yusuf and some of the ruling and/or aspiring politicians, as their decision aligned with his plan to promote strict adherence to Islamic law, but he was perhaps disappointed, as the type of

Sharia law that was introduced across northern states fell short of the standard that he had expected (Cited in Olabanji, 2015:15)

Obviously, the link between Sheriff and Boko Haram most especially during his electioneering campaign is not debatable. The political underpinning that supported the rise of the groups is impregnability in the light of group's involvement in the politics of parts of Yobe and especially Borno state in the 2000s to the extent that Sheriff sponsored some Boko Haram members to hajj at the inception of his administration. Also, the interpretations and representation of Boko Haram as a protest against the government of the then President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan due to his Christian and Southern backgrounds often overlook these local political links. According to Late General Owoye Azazi during a public address at the South South Economic Summit in April 2012, attributed Boko Haram's uprising to the quest by northern political elites to rule Nigeria by all means (The Punch ,April 2012).The declaration by Azazi was a pointer to the fact that the altering of zoning formula of People Democratic Party by former President Jonathan represents a major cause of Boko Haram. Thus, as plausible as this assertion by Azazi might be, is quite simplistic and naive for two major reasons(1) The emergence of Boko Haram in the early 2000s predates ascension of President Jonathan as the president of Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2010.Also,it was former president Yar'Adua, a northerner and Muslim, who first ordered a military crackdown on Boko Haram in 2009 following the intensity of violence occasioned by Boko Haram and having fallen out with its local political allies (2) Boko Haram is committed to killing Muslims as it is committed to killing Christians as well the attack against political leaders and emirs in the North place its activities and ideologies beyond the template of religion because of the preference and respect accorded to the institution among Nigerian Muslims .

Hence, the discussions of Boko Haram as simply a North-South/Muslim-Christian political divide misrepresent the current situation. In addendum with the above analysis, the study also finds out that poverty is another major cause of Boko Haram. It represents a key explanatory factor in the emergence of Boko Haram. Nigeria is a rich country with poor inhabitants because of leadership failure in the country. Albeit, poverty is a universal phenomenon but the peculiarity of poverty in the northern Nigeria is not debatable. Despite being a major oil exporter, many Nigerians remain poor most especially people in the North West and North East of Nigeria. Similarly, Nigeria's low human development rankings on the United Nations Annual Human Development Reports provides ample evidence of the state

of poverty and underdevelopment in the country and for several years UNDP Human development Reports have consistently listed Nigeria as a low human development country. For example, the 2014 reports ranks Nigeria 152 out of 187 countries covered, followed by Cameroun and Madagascar (New York: United Nations, 2014). In a similar vein, National Bureau of Statistics estimated national poverty profile to be 61.9 percent nationally, and northern eastern Nigeria, the epic center of Boko Haram rates are higher than 70 percent as at 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Illiteracy rates are higher in the north, life expectancy and per capital income are equally low when compared to the rates in southern parts of Nigeria. The unemployment situation in the country is alarming. In 2011, the unemployment situation among the youth in Nigeria was 37.7 percent while the northern states were the highest when compared to their southern counterparts (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010)

Consequently, because of galloping poverty in the North, Boko Haram was able to gather momentum in term of membership and recruitments. According to Hansen and Musa, the prevalence of mass poverty and deprivation among the many people in northern Nigeria on one hand and the high-level corruption among the political and religious class on the other provide an opportunity for Boko Haram to continually recruit members into its fold (Cited in Olabanji, 2015:17). Also, the existence of unemployment and chronic poverty served as impetus for Boko Haram to flourish and challenge the authority of the state and there is no doubt that economic problems have worsened in Nigeria more than a decades and this constitutes a factor in the outbreak of Boko Haram .Also, Maitatsine movement flourished in 1980s because of economic ills, high prices, scarcity, retrenchment and unemployment. In 1980, the absolute poverty in the country was 29 percent and today is estimated around 62 percent. This economic predicament driving Boko Haram is totally undeniable. Also, the problem of climate change which has grossly affected the agricultural produce in the North and the countries in the Lake Chad Basin is another perspective towards understanding Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The three North Eastern states in Nigeria which are original constituencies of Boko Haram (Borno, Yola, and Adamawa) are arid zones with serious climate variations that always threaten the survival of crops and animals on yearly basis. The porosity of Nigerian border is another factor; some migrants from neighboring countries like Chad and Niger, always migrate to these cities in search of casual jobs and Islamic studies most especially during the dry season. Worse still, the failure of government to support irrigation in rural areas has only worsened the trend of migration in the North East. The North East Arid Zone Development Programme (NEAZDP) launched in the late 1980 to help rural development in the northeastern Nigeria has

dramatically suffered from paucity of funds because of negligence on the part of government.

Finally, the study has established some findings on the causes of Boko Haram. Again, religion has become a scapegoat and the most unfortunate concept in analyzing the ethno-political and economic crises in contemporary Nigerian. The evolving Nation of Nigeria has many historical and political contradictions. However, the violence whether religious or political in the Nigerian polity is a means of identifying deficiencies in heterogenous society as a symptom of inequality, marginalization, exploitation, internal colonialism and the misuse of majoritarian democracy and national government in a prejudicial manner. As a result, some political anarchists or demons hide under the foregoing to fuel the various conflagrations as a means of expressing their grievances. Essentially, several indices of crises in Nigeria show the mixture of ethnicity and political grievances to interpret such disagreements as the genie of religious violence. However, religion is often a transparent tactic designed to conceal political and economic goals in Nigeria.

An Assessment of Counter Terrorism Strategies of President Goodluck Jonathan

Undoubtedly, Boko Haram uprising predated the emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan but it was able to increase its tentacle under his watch. As pointed out by Onapaju (2017), "Boko Haram had existed prior to Goodluck Jonathan as the group had its first major clash with the state in 2009 but grew into a more vicious and transnational terrorist organization on his watch". It is obvious that President Goodluck Jonathan mismanaged Boko Haram crisis and by the time he handed over power to President Mohammed Buhari, in May 2015, Boko Haram was already in control of 22 local governments and had caused 25,000 deaths (Tajudeen, 2017). It was under President Jonathan that Boko Haram pledge its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and renamed itself the Islamic State of the West African Province (ISWAP) with the reign of terror across the West African sub-region. Also, in 2015 Global Terrorism Index categorized Boko Haram as the most deadly terrorist group in the world having recorded an over 300 percent increase in terrorism deaths (Onapaju, 2017, p.1) The gross mismanagement of Boko Haram crisis under President Jonathan has provided ample justification for his defeat during 2015, General Election as Nigerians and the international community had completely lost confidence in his administration and considered his major challenger from All Progressives Congress (APC) as an alternative. However, in the mist of disillusionment that trailed the counter terrorism strategy of President Goodluck Jonathan, it can be situated within the context of two

theoretical approaches of orthodox terrorism approach and critical terrorism approach. According to Onapaju (2017) "counter-terrorism approaches are measures employed by states and inter-governmental organizations to protect against or mitigate future terrorist attacks and the proactive actions designed to forestall terrorist actions". However, counter terrorism strategies should not be mistaken to anti terrorism. As pointed out by Stepanova (2003), there is a conceptual difference between counter-terrorism and anti terrorism, the former is more of security instruments used against terrorism, while the later is all encompassing, it includes political, legal, economic, civil society and other peace building instruments (Cited in Onapaju, 2017, p.62). Similarly, all the attempt to get acceptable definition of terrorism has proved abortive, there has also been little consensus on the best counter-terrorism approach (Onapaju, 2017, p.62). In the extant literatures of terrorism, the debate is majorly divided between two school of thoughts, Traditional or Orthodox Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies with diverse perspectives on how terrorism can be ameliorated.

Clearly, terrorism has come to be a serious security challenge in the contemporary world. The new form of terrorism was consummated after September 11 attacks against the military architecture of US. Since that period terrorism has been considered as purely security problem with a clear justification on the use of excessive military force against terrorist groups and their sponsors. This strategy was advocated by the war model with recommendation on the use of military force to dislodge terrorists and their operational networks. This approach was adopted by the United States of America after September 11 attacks, the then president of US declared total war on terror coupled with the use of heavy military weapons which eventually led to the extermination of Osama Bin Laden, the former leader of Al-Qaida terrorist organization. Interestingly, states in international systems always adopt this approach as a means of convincing their citizens and the world about their strong military capacities. This approach always attracts commendations from public that government is serious about the war against terror. Basically, within the Orthodox Terrorism Studies, the military approach is taken along with other approaches, especially de-radicalization and multilateral approaches.

However, counter terrorism approach of President Goodluck Jonathan can be situated within the context of two approaches but majorly on Orthodox Counter terrorism strategy. Military operation began in 2011 following the establishment of JTF but heavy military approach against Boko Haram started in 2013 coupled with the declaration of state of emergency. Some analysts were of the opinion that given Nigeria's widely acclaimed military capacity and its successful operations in

different peace keeping operations across the globe that military operation will be a major panacea in dealing with Boko Haram crisis. The military approach was the primary approach of the government while other approaches remain peripheral approaches. Military approach was adopted through the instrumentalities of JTF consisting of the main components of the Nigerian armed forces, the Multi Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (a multilateral military arrangement which was constituted by countries in the Lake Chad region that included Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Benin). The civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a local vigilante group was also inaugurated in the North East. Despite the military approach against Boko Haram under President Goodluck Jonathan, the war against Boko Haram was far from being won, instead the group was able to grow in ranks and files because of some certain fundamental factors that bedeviled military approach. There are two major factors that were responsible for ineffectiveness in military operations in the North East. (1) The massive wave of corruption that bedeviled defense funds and arms purchases as revealed recently in Dasukigate where \$2.1 billion earmarked for the operation was diverted by military chiefs and politicians for personal gains. (2) Nigeria was considered as a country of interest on the gross abuse of fundamental human rights. United States of American and other human rights groups considered Nigeria as temple of human right abuse. This development eventually dovetailed into arms embargo being imposed against the country.

Unfortunately, the failure of Jonathan to decimate Boko Haram uprising led to his loss of popularity both at home and abroad. As pointed out by Gallup survey in 2015, it was reported that 95 percent of Nigerians saw Boko Haram as major threat to Nigeria, while two in three Nigerians (67per cent) said government is not doing enough in the war against the Boko Haram (Cited in Loschky, 2015; 2014). Undoubtedly, the government of Goodluck Jonathan demonstrated high level of incompetence and callous indifference in the management of Boko Haram most especially the kidnapping of 276 school girls by Boko Haram. Nevertheless, this military approach has attracted number of criticisms in different quarters. It was believed that battle against terrorists cannot be won through the barrel of guns even if it was objectively done that negotiation remains a potent weapon towards ending Boko Haram crisis in the North East. The developmental approach adopted by President Goodluck Jonathan can also be formalized through the lenses of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) approach. The CTS approach was an ideological departure to Orthodox approach. The central argument of the CTS's argument is that the orthodox approach is state-biased in its conception of the problem of terrorism which is located within the realm of the State and not citizens (Guning, 2007).

According to the CTS scholars, the atmosphere of insecurity created by the military operations against perceived terrorists in the name of counter-terrorism cannot be ignored as more civilians become the victims of operations (Human Right Watch, 2003). There are numerous studies that have pointed out that the use of force is not only a recipe for human rights violations and repressive regimes but also ineffective in ending terrorism. As a result of this critique, the proponents of the CTS approach advocated an alternative perspective that shift from state-centrism to a focus on security, freedom, and well being of human individuals. As a result of this it is believed that counter terrorism should majorly address the root cause of the problem which will eventually lead to long term solution.

However, it should be acknowledge that CTS approach remain a useful contribution to the discourse on terrorism. The importance given to negotiation in their approach seems unviable most especially in the context of Boko Haram. Although negotiations had worked in some circumstances as in the cases of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Basque group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain. The intolerable demands made by Boko Haram based on a supposed Islamisation of a secular state make it complex and difficult organization to negotiate with. As pointed out by Cronin (2010) "Governments cannot negotiate over demands they can neither understand nor satisfy, and more to the point, popular opinion cannot understand or support such talks. Although, President Goodluck Jonathan made some attempts to negotiate with Boko Haram without any meaningful outcome. Within the framework of political and developmental approaches President Goodluck Jonathan was able to practicalize the philosophical underpinning of CTS. As argued by Onapaju (2017)

The political approach was developed from an emergent perspective popular in northern Nigeria that suggested that Boko Haram was a manifestation of the unequal power and resource distribution at the national level, which was against the interest of the region. The Boko Haram problem was, therefore seen as an expression of the seemingly legitimate grievance of the youths in the region. This informed the idea that a good approach for dealing with the crisis was to engage in dialogue with the leadership of Boko Haram, and possibly offer amnesty to members of the group. The elite in the north played a significant role in lobbying government to take this route. They rationalized that since the approach had worked in the case of the Niger Delta militant, it could also be successful in the case of Boko Haram. A

notable step taken by the government in this regard was the setting up of the 17-member committee on Dialogue and peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North in April 2013 for Identifying and constructively engaging key leaders of Boko Haram, and developing a workable framework for amnesty and disarmament of members of the group.

As pointed out by Uzodike and Onapaju, the political approach was unable to record its slated objectives for two major reasons (1) The elites in the north were skeptical to this approach, they were in best positions to establish communication with Boko Haram group about the willingness of Jonathan-led federal government (2) There was growing dissatisfaction about the fall out of the 2011 presidential elections, which did not favor the power rotation arrangement of the PDP(3). Boko Haram had become fragmented organization with different groups which eventually made the negotiation to be a tall order. Similarly, there was wide spectrum of opinions among scholars and stakeholders that Boko Haram crisis was an indication of socio-economic malady in the country orchestrated by bad governance. The developmental approach of the government under President Jonathan received some degree of support from those who considered Boko Haram as economic problem. However, developmental approach was primarily aimed at addressing the perceived root causes of the crisis. The primary target was the army of Almajiri youths which eventually led to the modernization of the Madrassa-model of Almajiri Islamic education in 2012. The major focus of this programme was to empower the northern masses and disabuse their minds that western education is profitable. Unfortunately, this programme was unable to yield expected results because of the difficulties in integrating Islamic education with western education coupled with the poor implementation of the programme.

However, the government of President Goodluck Jonathan also came up with a framework known as presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE) in 2011, with a study of the causes and consequences of crisis. In 2012 and 2013, two more studies followed one by the Office of the National Security Adviser and another conducted in partnership with European Union. Subsequently, soft approach to Countering Terrorism policy was launched to address the underlying economic problems of the North East. The effort then created the economic intervention platform, which the presidency announced in 2014 (PCNI, 2016, P.23). This initiative was announced as a bottom up approach to sustain contribution of the region itself through its governors and private/public stakeholders. It will be recalled that on 3rd and 4th December 2013, the Executive Governors of the six States in the North East

gathered in Gombe, Gombe State for the 2nd North East Economic Summit. The first one took place in Bauchi, Bauchi State on 6th and 7th December 2012. The effort of the Office of National Security Adviser informed the presidential decision to attend this 2nd North East Summit, where the Presidential Initiative for the North East was announced. Another important outcome of the 2nd Summit was the resolve of the representatives of the people of the region at the highest political level to prepare a development plan similar to the Marshall Plan at the State level. This development eventually dovetailed to constitution of North East Regional Development Plan Committee to prepare the States' Regional Plan (PCNI, 2016, P.24). This plan was captioned as NEST: "The North East States representation from the affected States to the Federal government. This regional plan eventual led to Federal Government's National Planning effort for the region from its initial stages. Interestingly, on July 16, 2014, the former President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated a committee called Victim Support Fund under the leadership of General T.Y Danjuma with the following mandate:

- (a) To identify sources and ways of raising sustainable funding to support victims of Boko Haram terror activities
- (b) To develop appropriate strategies for the fund raising
- (c) To ascertain the persons, communities, facilities and economic asset affected by Boko Haram terror activities
- (d) To assess and determine the appropriate support required in each case
- (e) To manage, disburse and/or administer support to the victims as appropriate
- (f) To address related challenges as may be appropriate
- (e) To advise Government on other matter(s) necessary or incidental to the support victims of Boko Haram terror activities

The Victim support committee was able to set up the Nigerian Foundation for the support of Victims of Boko Haram crisis as a Private Sector led initiative, which was the implementation arm of the Committee, with selected members of the committee as its Board. There was official Fundraising Dinner on July 31, 2014, where the committee was able to raise over 50 Billion in pledges and with over 20 Billion Naira redeemed as at 2016 (PCNI, 2016, P.25). Also, the idea of safe school initiative was also conceived on May 7, 2014, during the World Economic Forum Africa (WEFA) in Abuja. The primary aim of the initiative was to urgently protect hundreds of schools across the country most especially in the North East, starting with schools in the North East from future attacks and kidnaps. Subsequently, President Good luck Jonathan inaugurated Steering Committee for the initiative on July 9, 2014. However, despite the counter terrorism strategies of President

Goodluck Jonathan, the North East was highly battered by Boko Haram which eventually led to his electoral defeat in 2015. Boko Haram crisis played a major role in 2015 General Elections, the expectation was high among Nigerians that General Buhari will perform better in decimating Boko Haram activities. Also, majority of Nigerians lost confidence in his administration because of his inability to dislodge Boko Haram in the North East. This eventually dovetailed into historic victory of President Mohammed Buhari.

Counter Terrorism Strategies of President Mohammed Buhari Administration

As pointed above, the issue of Boko Haram crisis was a major campaign issue during the electioneering campaign of President Mohammed Buhari which eventually worked in his favor. The outcome of 2015 General Elections was an expression of dissatisfactions from different quarters against the government of President Goodluck Jonathan. The war against Boko Haram was not new to Buhari because he had successfully fought a similar group as the head of state during the Maitatsine uprising in the North. Remarkably, the emergence of Buhari as the president in May 2015 eventually changed the dynamic of anti-Boko Haram war. The administration of President Buhari situated Boko Haram crisis within the context Orthodox Terrorism Studies. It was considered as purely military problem. After the assumption of office, President Buhari travelled to different countries to redeem the battered image of Nigeria under President Goodluck Jonathan and seek international cooperation for fighting the terrorists. Also, the strategic importance of Lake Chad Basin was prioritized by President Mohammed Buhari coupled with his visitation to Niger, Chad and Cameroon, to strategize the building up of the capacity of the MNJTF to wage an effective campaign against Boko Haram. In furtherance of strengthening the partnership, Nigerian government hosted a meeting of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in June 2015 with the commitment of \$100million to revive joint military operations (Onapaju, 2017, p.68)

Similarly, the cooperation of western countries was considered as a major factor in winning the war against Boko Haram. It will be recalled that some countries like US and other developed countries withdrew their supports from Nigeria mainly because of abuse of fundamental human right. Interestingly, President Mohammed Buhari attended the meeting of G7 held in June 2015 in Germany where he used the opportunity to seek the assistance of world leaders in the war against Boko Haram. Also, Buhari was invited by the former president of US Barrack Obama which eventually dovetailed into renewed diplomatic relations between Nigerian and United States of America. Buhari government also hosted an international summit in Abuja to discuss the Boko Haram issue which was well

attended by the world leaders including the French President Francois Hollande. The decadence of military capacity under President Goodluck Jonathan was considered as a major factor that brought Boko Haram to its present fold. Because of this reason, President Buhari dismissed the leadership of armed forces as well as the National Security Adviser and brought new bloods to the frontline of military administration. Also, during the inauguration, President Buhari announced the relocation of operation base of the military from Abuja to the epic centre of the war in Maiduguri. This decision was greeted with much euphoria both at home and abroad. Government also increased welfare packages and ensured prompt payment of the salaries entitlements of soldiers on battlefield which was not prioritized under President Goodluck Jonathan because of massive corruption that bedeviled his administration.

Undoubtedly, Buhari administration has made a tremendous impact in the world against Boko Haram but the recent revelation by the Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed, that Boko Haram has been largely defeated was an over statement, the present governor of Borno State also made a disgusting revelation that Borno State is now safe than Lagos State. In a similar vein, President Buhari also made a complicated comment that Boko Haram has been technically defeated. However, the over celebration of the war against Boko Haram in the North East has contributed to recent resurgence of Boko Haram. As argued by Onapaju, (2017), there is no doubt that the capacity of Boko Haram has been degraded but progress should not be mistaken for victory. The recent bombing and renewed attacks by Boko Haram in strategic places in the North East was an indication that the war against Boko Haram is far from being won. Recently, Boko Haram attacked oil workers in Maiduguri and number of University lecturers, which have sent another signal to Nigerian Army that over celebration of the war against Boko Haram was more political than reality. It has been observed that Sambisa Forest is large area as the landmass of the forest is more than what media always portray, that army has not captured the main stream of the forest. Also, there was also spectrum of opinions among selected soldiers in the North East that porosity of Nigeria Border will not make Sambisa Forest to be totally captured because there are different escape routes in the forest.

Although, it cannot be contested that the government has made some remarkable progress in the war against Boko Haram. In a pan-Nigerian opinion poll, the Governance Accountability Initiative of Nigeria (GAIN), 81 percent of respondents gave positive ratings to the government for fighting Boko Haram (Fabiya & Otunuga, 2015). It will be recalled that Boko Haram was in control of 22

local government in the North East under President Jonathan out of 774 local governments in Nigeria. With the efforts of President Buhari, all these local governments have been integrated and some degrees of normalcy have started returning to the devastated areas. Also, the international airport in Maiduguri, which was shut down in December 2013 following attacks on the military and air force base close to the air port, was reopened in July 2015 for commercial operations. Another success recorded under this current administration was Damboa market, a popular cattle market in Borno state which was closed down in 2014 because of incessant attacks by the Boko Haram was also reopened on September 6, 2016. Also, there was jubilation in the North East in 2016 as the residents were able to celebrate Eid without any fear of bomb attacks. Basically, there is no doubt that Boko Haram has been degraded to some certain level but there are many threats suggesting that the Boko Haram threat still exists and it is unprofessional for the government to give itself a pass mark at this stage.

Efforts of Non Governmental Organizations in the War against Boko Haram

Since the beginning of Boko Haram crisis in the North East several nongovernmental organizations have rendered different assistance in tackling the menace of Boko Haram. Apart from the efforts of National Emergency Management Agency and State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), there are other non governmental agencies across the globe that has extended their tentacle to the North Eastern Nigeria. Also, at the national level the role of philanthropy in fighting the humanitarian crisis in the North East is not negligible. As earlier pointed out, the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated the Victims Support Fund Committee, with the primary responsibility of sourcing support funds both from public and private pockets for the victims of Boko Haram crisis. Interestingly, Billions of naira was raised but the question of how the money was spent has generated a lot of controversial arguments. Similarly, African richest man and billionaire "Alhaji Aliko Dangote, the Borno State born Alhaji Mohammed Indimi and Nigeria's Former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, amongst other have been in the forefront in tackling the humanitarian crisis in the North East through financial assistance.

Since the inception of Boko Haram crisis, Dangote has made donation worth over 3.2 billion to the displaced Nigerians and most recently, the delivery of 106 trucks of food and relief across the region through Dangote Foundation (The Nation, July 9, 2016). Atiku Abubakar has also made tremendous contribution through America University of Nigeria (AUN) in Yola, Adamawa State. The American University has been working in tandem with the Adamawa Peacekeeping

Initiative (API) which was formed in January 2012. Also, the API was able to launch the Insurgency Intervention Fund, a one billion naira contributory fundraising programme that was designed to assist in rehabilitating IDPs in violence-prone Adamawa State. As at 2015, the AUN and API teams were responsible for the feeding and provision of shelters for over 300,000 IDPs in Adamawa, the organization also provided foods and other relief materials for over 163,500 (The Nation, July 9, 2016). The AUN President, Dr Magree Ensign, who chairs the API, claimed that the organization has initiated numerous programs in the community to benefit both indigenes and IDPs. In a similar vein, the AUN also partnered with local religious and community leaders to establish a programme for vulnerable Nigerian youths which was christened as the "Feed and Read". The efforts of various international nongovernmental organizations in the North East cannot be easily ignored most especially the efforts of different specialized agencies of United Nations such as UNICEF, International Originations for Migrations, United Nations High Commission for Refugees among others. Recently, Governor Shettima of Borno State identified over 126 nongovernmental organizations in Borno State with low performances. According to Shettima, most of these Non Governmental Organizations have turned the North East to a money marking venture as most of the money earmarked for Boko Haram victims were diverted for personal gains (The Nation, July 9, 2016). The only nongovernmental organization that received the pass mark of the governor were those representing United Nations most especially UNICEF.

However, just like NEMA funding is a major challenge of these nongovernmental organizations. It will be recalled that Memorandum of Understanding that was signed by NEMA with the government of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states over the feeding of IDPs was bedeviled by financial constraint. The budget of NEMA had been cut down from 1.5 billion to #400 million monthly owing to dwindling natural resources arising from low international price of oil (The Nation, July 9, 2016). Also, some other international nongovernmental organization also lamented the unavailability of funds as a major challenge in tackling the problem of Boko Haram crisis in the North East which has made humanitarian crisis in Nigeria to be among the worst in the world (Angella, 2016).

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is not peculiar to Nigeria alone, but the peculiarity of poor state response in Nigeria cannot be denied. It is unfortunate that some prominent people hide under the cover of fighting Boko Haram to steal Nigerian commonwealth. The study considered state and non state responses through the prism of counter

terrorism and anti terrorism strategies. The counter terrorism strategy of President Good luck Jonathan was far below international standards. The military operations against Boko Haram were rated abysmally low by Human Right Watch. Also, Nigeria was regarded as a temple of human right abuse under President Goodluck Jonathan which eventually led to arms embargo on Nigeria. The kidnapping of 276 Chibok Girls in Borno State was another testimony against the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan and despite all the noises and promises, his administration was unable to rescue Chibok Girls not until recently that Buhari government made some remarkable progress to bring back over 100 girls from the custody of Boko Haram. However, the study also observed that Jonathan lost his re election bid because of his inability to decimate the capacity of Boko Haram. Interesting, the emergence of President Mohammed Buhari marked the beginning of new counter terrorism approach in Nigeria. The current administration has made some fundamental progress but the over celebration of this progress has relaxed the war against Boko Haram which has made Boko Haram to regroup in a more brutal way. Basically, it is recommended that government has to reason beyond military approach in fighting Boko Haram, also there should be viable legal framework against terrorism if possible government should establish a specialized court that would be prosecuting terrorists and their sponsors. The Terrorism Prohibition Act of 2011 is not enough in the war against Boko Haram. The rebuilding of North East should be done with sincerity of purpose to avoid second phase of Boko Haram in the future; the politicization of the war against Boko Haram should be discouraged to achieve meaningful development in the war against Boko Haram.

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