
Crop Farmers Adjustments Strategies to Civil Disturbances in Bauchi South Senatorial Zone

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ABSTRACT

The study was carried out to assess the effects of civil unrest on crop production in Bauchi South Senatorial zone. The target population included all crop farmers who had been affected by incessant crises in the zone. A multistage sampling procedure was adapted to purposively select three Local government areas (LGAs) out of the seven LGAs in the zone based on their involvement in the crises recorded in the area. A structured interview schedule was used to collect data from 84 respondents for the study while percentage and mean score were employed in analyzing the data. The findings show that majority (64%) of the respondents had one hectare of farm land with an annual average income of (₦ 12,297.6) per annum. The major causes of conflict in the area were rights to the ownership of Tafawa Balewa town and social injustice (82% each). Crops cultivated during crises included rice (77%), maize (66%) and cowpea (62%). Migration of farmers in conflict areas ($M=2.57$), loss of lives ($M=2.46$) and inadequate food ($M=2.45$) were perceived by the respondents as the major effects of conflict. Praying for peace ($M=2.79$), cultivate crops near the village ($M=2.54$) and diversification of crops ($M=2.43$) were employed by farmers as adjustment strategies. It was recommended that opportunities should be created to employ idle youths who are available tools for use in times of conflict through skill work acquisition. Similarly there is need to enhance peace and harmony in the country so as to create conducive environment for agriculture and other economic ventures.

Keywords: Crop farmers, adjustment, crisis, Bauchi

INTRODUCTION

Civil disturbances pose fundamental threats to crop production especially crop yield due to displacement and relocation of farmers from

their farms. Where a social system is disrupted in structure or function, operations of farm business attempt to adjust to the prevailing circumstances (Gizaki, 2013).

The southern senatorial zone of Bauchi State and the three LGAs (Bogoro, Dass and Tafawa Balewa) in particular has, for a considerable length of time, been a hotbed of civil disturbances widely believed to have been spawned by competition for resources, land, creation of chiefdoms and marginalization among other factors (Chime, 2011). Farming, which is the mainstay of the economy in the area, contributes significantly to earnings and revenue. However, the area remains grossly underdeveloped, pauperized and marginalized. Several years of violent conflicts have resulted in destruction of crops, loss of lives and property as well as environmental degradation, thereby narrowing the range of economic opportunities for the ethnic nationalities and religious groups that inhabit the area.

Agriculture, being the largest sector of the economy, employs nearly 70% of the active labour force mostly in the area of crop production. However, the economic and social dislocations caused by internal conflicts have impacted negatively on crop production. Such disturbances often lead to loss of lives especially farm families, destruction and loss of farm lands as well as houses. Those not displaced from conflict areas according to Uzuegbunam, (2005) face reduced and inadequate infrastructure and other facilities needed for decent living. A study by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (2010) shows that the unfortunate occurrence and in several cases reoccurrence of social conflicts in various localities in Nigeria have contributed undoubtedly to the deterioration of the poverty situation, not only in the directly affected areas but also in areas affected by inflows of internally displaced people. The uncertainties associated with actual or potential conflict situations also tend to discourage serious in-country commitment of investments, domestic as well as foreign (Francis, 2004).

There are many effects of civil disturbances in Nigeria. One is decreased agricultural production: In northeast Nigeria, various violent conflicts over land resources have led to decrease in agricultural production. The clashes between various ethnic groups, occupational and resident groups usually result in the destruction of farmlands and consequent destruction of crops. In some cases this is followed by retaliation actions by cultivators including killing of live stocks owned by the herdsman. All these hamper the overall production of food crops and animals. This implies increased hunger, diseases and malnutrition (Obioha, 2005).

The Southern zone of Bauchi State especially Tafawa Balewa town has always been on the news, mostly for rancor, unrest and violent uproar. The area has been a boiling point of constant attacks, killings of the residents and reprisals. These crises have been given much coloration as to being ethnic, socio-political, or religious which have lingered for over 50 years. A count of the litany of woes of these crises are, 1948, 1959, 1991, 1995, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2011 and recently 2012. These events have made of civilians, militias, and a case of defensive in the face of any offensive (Dyikuk, 2012). These conflicts have usually resulted in waste of precious time and energy needed for growing food, reduction in farm size and crop output in the conflict areas. They have also increased the pressure on food supply in the neighboring villages where most of the displaced refugees are relocated.

In view of the above, this study is designed to assess adjustments strategies employed by farmers under civil disturbances in Bauchi South senatorial zone. The study will seek to answer the following research questions: What are the causes of civil disturbances? What are the adjustment strategies employed by the farmers? What are the effects of civil disturbances on crop production?

The specific objectives were to:

- (i) Ascertain respondents' perception of the causes of civil disturbances,

- (ii) Ascertain the patterns of crop adjustment strategies employed by the farmers
- (iii) Determine the prices of crop products before and during crises and
- (iv) Determine the effects of civil disturbances on crop production.

METHODOLOGY

The study was carried out in Bauchi South Senatorial District. It comprises of seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) namely Alkaleri, Bogoro, Bauchi, Dass, Kirfi, Toro and Tafawa Balewa. Like the rest of Bauchi State, the southern zone is colored by ethnic diversity. The residents are mainly, Za'ar (Sayawa) and Jarawa with some few Fulani, Kanuri, Ngas and Boyawa mostly whom are farmers except for a few Igbo traders in the LGA headquarters. Reasons for this occupation span from the speculation that their migration from the east to the present location was in search of security and farmland. Little wonder, they were and are still known for both farming and hunting activities (Dyikuk, 2012). The zone has a population of 2,497,782 and a land area of 33,161km² (NPC, 2006).

Sampling Techniques

The population for the study comprised all farmers in the senatorial district. The target population included all the crop farmers who had been affected by incessant crises in the zone.

A multistage sampling procedure was adopted. First, three LGAs (Bogoro, Dass and Tafawa Balewa) out of the seven LGAs were purposively selected based on their involvement in the crises recorded in the area. In mapping out the villages in Bauchi South senatorial zone a purposive sampling technique was employed, because the focus is on villages that had direct experience of conflict in the zone. From each of the villages 12 respondents were selected using simple random sampling method. Generally, 84 respondents were used for the study.

A structured interview schedule was used. The research also relied on study tours to the conflict sites. This entailed the use of the observation technique which enabled the researcher to observe firsthand the nature of the farming being practiced and interaction between groups in the conflict areas, relationships in post-conflict situation, the remaining physical evidence of the conflicts from 1991-2015, and whether or not persons initially displaced have been able to return to their homes and businesses e t c.

Data Analysis

Objectives 1 and 2 were analyzed using percentage. Objective 3 was analyzed using mean scores.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Data in Table 1 show that majority (74%) of the respondents were male. This shows that there were more male than female headed farming household in the area.

Table 1 show that greater proportions (35.7%) of the respondents were between 35-44 years old, while 29.8% represented those that were less than 35 years old. The mean age of the farmers was 44 years. This shows that generally the farmers were relatively young and capable of developing constructive dialogue, cultures and practices of tolerance, negotiations and rebalancing of interests in the process of changing the nature and intensity of conflict. This conforms to what is normally obtained among rural farmers in Nigeria (Alubo, 2006).

Table 1 reveals that majority (91.7%) of the respondents were married. This indicates that more married persons' are affected with the crisis in the area. In line with this United Nations (1995) estimated that between 70 and 80% of the world's 14 million refugees and internally displaced farmers populations are comprised of women and children.

Table 1 shows that about 51.1% of the respondents had household size of between 6-10, while 30.9% had between 1-5, 14.2% had 11-15 household size. The remaining 3.8% represented respondents who had between 16-20 household sizes. The mean household size of the respondents was 8 persons. This implies a fairly large household which could possibly add more pressure on food, competition for scarce resources and other basic needs which could lead to conflict.

Majorities (52.4%) of the respondents were farmers, 33.3% were civil servants and 7.1% were into trading. This result indicates that farming is the major occupation of the respondents. This agrees with Ekong (2010) that the greater proportion of economic activities in the Nigerian rural areas depends directly on the exploitation of the land. This could be attributed to one of the reasons for land dispute in the area.

Data contained in Table 1 also reveals that farm land ranged from 0.5 to 3 hectares. However, about 63.9% of the farmers owned one hectare. The mean farm size of the respondents was 1.43 hectares. This shows the preponderance of small scale farming among the respondents. This could also be attributed to the persistent crisis witnessed in the area as a result of population displacement. This is in agreement with the findings of Paul and John (1996) that refugees may increase population density and cause environmental degradation, land fragmentation and competition, disease, food shortages, and lack of clear water, generating conflict and violence across borders.

Table 1 reveals that majority (57.1%) of the respondents were Christians, 41.7% were Muslims while the remaining 1.2% were other religion. This multi-religious composition could be the major reason for religious conflict in the area. This composition was confirmed by Onigu (1999) that there are three religious groups in Bauchi south: Christianity, Islam and traditional religions. This is in agreement with the findings of Eghosa et al. (2005) that ethno-religious clashes have proved to be the

most violent instances of inter-group crisis in Nigeria. The International IDEA (2000) agreed with this giving example of violent ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria which included Tafawa Balewa clashes in 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2011, 2012 and 2015 in Bauchi State. Otite (2002) reaffirmed that after the 1973 population census Nigeria stopped asking its populace about their ethnic and religious identities, believing that these are too contentious and could generate public contestation and conflict along such lines. Similarly, Yuguda (2009) also opines that people hide under these two religions to foment trouble and cause death of innocent people, just to achieve their selfish aims.

Table 1 also shows that a greater proportion (47.6%) were the Sayawa, followed by Jarawa (26.2%), Fulani (11%). The remaining (13.1%) of the respondents are other minor tribes. This study reveals that the area is a home to a significant number of ethnic groups. Best (2011) opines that in the Nigerian context, ethnicity and religion are the principal identities around which violent conflicts occur and that ethnicity and religion cannot be clearly demarcated, because the situation can turn around.

Table 1 further reveals that a greater proportion of the respondents (62%) belonged to tribal association, 31% of them belonged to both cooperative society and thrift (adashe) and savings groups while the remaining 19% belonged to no organizations. This implies that tribalism is a common feature which could be the major reason for persistent conflict in the area, because each tribe may have interest, standpoints, beliefs and views to pursue. The findings are in agreement with Katherine (2006) who opines that the elite in tribal organization use ethnicity, ethnic politics and religious bigotry as weapons purposely to create disunity so as to achieve selfish ends.

The average annual income of respondents was ₦12,297.6 per annum. Majority of the respondents (67%) earned below ₦100000 per annum while 17.8% earned between ₦100001 – ₦200000 per annum. These

farmers were leaving below poverty line by earning less than \$1 per day. This confirms the prevalence of poverty among rural farmers in Nigeria, as noted by Chukwuone and Agwu (2005). Similarly, Chuta (2004) lists poverty as one of the principal causes of intra-communal crises. In contrast, Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) report that if poverty exists and has apparently existed as pervasive and structural factors of the Nigerian state, why has it not produced the sort of conflict that we have witnessed in recent years.

Table 1: Percentage distribution of respondents according to socio-economic characteristics

Socio-economic characteristics	Percentage	Mean
Sex		
Male	74.0	
Female	26.0	
Age		
Less than 35 years	29.8	
35-44	35.7	
45-54	26.2	41.08
55-64	7.1	
65 and above	1.2	
Marital status		
Single	7.1	
Married	91.7	
Divorce	1.2	
Household size		
1-5	30.9	
6-10	51.1	
11-15	14.2	8
16-20	3.8	
Major occupation		
Farming	52.4	
Trading	7.1	
Civil/Public service	33.3	
Artisan	1.2	

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Others	6.0	
Farm size		
0.5	1.2	
1	63.9	1.43
2	26.5	
3	8.4	
Religion		
Islam	41.7	
Christianity	57.1	
Others	1.2	
Tribe		
Jarawa	26.2	
Sayawa	47.6	
Fulani	13.1	
Others	13.1	
Membership of organization		
Cooperative society/Thrift and saving groups	31.0	
No organizations	19.0	
Tribal association	62.0	
Estimate of income per annum (₦)		
Less than 100000	67.0	
100001-200000	17.8	
200001-300000	10.7	12297.6
300001-400000	3.5	
400001-500000	3.5	
Above 500001	1.1	

Source: Field work, 2012.

Table 2 indicates that rights to the ownership of Tafawa Balewa town by each of the ethnic groups (81%), social injustice (81%), marginalization (79.8), bridge of agreement (69%), equal power sharing (67.9%), religious intolerance (67.9), inadequate punishment for offenders/culprits of previous conflict (64.3%), non-creation of Sayawa chiefdom (59.5%), illiteracy (58.3%), poverty (58.3%) and non-implementation of government white paper on previous conflict (56%)

were perceived as the major causes of conflict while inadequate land for crop production (40.5%), large numbers of unemployed youth (26.2%), boundary and land dispute (13.1%), taking of drugs and/or alcohol (4.8%), tribal differences (3.6%), inadequate social amenities (2.4%), inadequate grazing land (1.2%), stealing of livestock and crop produce (1.2%), damage to crops (1.2%) and cultural differences (1.2) were considered by the respondents as not serious. This implies that a round table/dialogue forum should be encouraged among the various ethnic groups to sensitize them on the negative effect of conflict. The result confirmed the findings of some earlier studies by Ibenwa and Ayogu (2010) on the factors responsible for inter-communal crises in Nigeria that poverty, land disputes, social injustice, and religious intolerance among others are the causes of conflict in Nigeria.

Table 2: Percentage distribution of respondents according to their perception of the causes of conflict (n=84)

Causes	Percentage	Rank
Poverty	58.3	9
Non implementation of government white paper on previous conflict	56	11
numbers of unemployed youth	26.2	13
Rights to the ownership of Tafawa Balewa town by each of the ethnic group	81.2	1
Marginalization	79.8	3
Boundary and land dispute	13.1	14
Inadequate punishment for offenders/culprits of previous conflict	64.3	7
Inadequate grazing land	1.2	18
Inadequate land for crop production	40.5	12
Illiteracy	58.3	9
Power sharing among the different groups in the area	67.9	5

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Non creation of Sayawa chiefdom	59.5	8
Inadequate social amenities	2.4	17
Stealing of livestock and crop produce	1.2	18
Taking of drugs and/ or alcohol	4.8	15
Bridge of agreement	69.0	4
Damage to crops	1.2	18
Social injustice	81.0	2
Cultural differences	1.2	18
Tribal differences	3.6	16
Religious intolerance	67.9	6

Source: Field work, 2012

Table 3 reveals that crops like rice (-35.5%), pepper (-149.2%), melon (-43.5%), cowpea (-10.5%), atcha (-21.2%), bambara (-300%), garden egg (-150%), onion (-11.5%), soybean (-5.9%) and ginger (-60%) were preferred during crisis than before the crisis while sorghum (64.2%), maize (33.8%), millet (68.2%), cassava (49.1%), yam (37.4%), cocoyam and cotton (100 % each), tomatoes (22.5%) and sugarcane (10.1%) were mostly cultivated during the crisis. The reasons for this variation could be for security reasons because most of the crops cultivated during crisis were mostly short growing crops which do not cover the entire vicinity. The implication is that there will be scarcity of some crops which may lead to increase in the prices of agricultural products due to non-availability of the products coupled with their demand. This is in agreement with the findings of The Economist (2005) that conflicts in Africa have resulted in waste of precious time and energy needed for growing food in the conflict zones.

Table 3: Crops cultivated before and during the crisis in 2011

Crop	Before the crisis (%)	During the crisis (%)	Difference
Soybean (<i>Glycine max</i>)	28.6	30.3	- 5.9
Cowpea (<i>Vigna unguilata</i>)	56.0	61.9	- 10.5
Sugarcane (<i>Saccharum officinarum</i>)	11.9	10.7	-10.1
Maize (<i>Zea mays</i>)	98.8	65.5	33.8
Millet (<i>Eleusine coracana</i>)	29.8	9.5	68.2
Guineacorn (<i>Sorghum bicolor</i>)	63.1	22.6	64.2
Rice (<i>Oryza sativa</i>)	57.1	77.4	- 35.5
Sweet potatoes (<i>Ipomea batatas</i>)	20.2	20.2	0
Yam (<i>Dioscorea spp</i>)	19.0	11.9	37.4
Cassava (<i>Manihot spp</i>)	21.0	10.7	49.1
Groundnut (<i>Arachis hypogeal</i>)	38.1	38.1	0
Garden egg (<i>Solanum melongena</i>)	2.4	6.0	- 150
Onion (<i>Allium cepa</i>)	31.0	34.5	- 11.2
Pepper (<i>Capsicum spp</i>)	6.7	16.7	- 149.2
Tomatoes (<i>Lycopersicon esculentum</i>)	10.7	8.3	22.5
Cotton (<i>Gossypium herbaceum</i>)	2.4	-	100
Atcha (<i>Digitaria exilis</i>)	22.6	27.4	- 21.2
Cocoyam (<i>Colocasia esculenta</i>)	2.4	-	100
Okro (<i>Albemoschus esculentus</i>)	7.1	7.1	0
Bambara (<i>Vigna subteranea</i>)	1.2	4.8	- 300
Ginger (<i>Zingiber officinale</i>)	2.0	3.2	- 60
Melon (<i>Colocynthis citrullus</i>)	14.0	20.1	- 43.5

Source: Field work, 2012.

Table 4 reveals that irrigation farming (56.6%), shifting cultivation (100%), application of fertilizer (29.4%), storage of field crops (18.8%) and bush burning (16%) were preferred before the crisis. Similarly, use of organic manure (- 32.6%), use of herbicide (-18.1%) and mixed cropping (-

11.9%) were commonly practiced by the respondents during the crisis. This implies that irrigation farming which is commonly practiced on flooded lowland (fadama) areas was abandoned for fear of being attack by the enemies. Similarly, storage of field crops was also abandoned during crisis since civil disturbances can lead to destruction of property. This finding is in agreement with Hoomlong (2010) who opines that conflict can lead to destruction of property ranging from residential houses, business premises and farm products.

Table 4: Patterns of crop production

Pattern	Before the crisis in 2011 Frequency	(%)	During the crisis in 2011 Frequency	(%)	Difference
Bush burning	88	73.92	74	62.16	16
Shifting cultivation	20	16.8	-	-	100
Irrigation farming	76	63.84	33	27.72	56.6
Mixed cropping	59	49.56	66	55.44	- 11.9
Mono cropping	-	-	-	-	-
Use of organic manure	43	36.12	57	47.88	- 32.6
Application of fertilizer	65	54.6	46	38.64	29.4
Weeding	76	63.84	54	45.36	29
Use of herbicide	55	46.2	65	54.6	-18.1
Use of insecticide	70	58.8	44.2	36.96	37.3
Pest and disease control	35	29.4	45	37.8	- 28.5
Harvesting and processing	56	47.04	44	62.16	-32.1
Storage of field crops	80	67.2	63	54.6	18.8

Source: Field work, 2012.

Results from Table 5 shows that respondents with 1 hectare of land before the crisis in 2011 were 42 (50.6%), but during the crisis, 1.2% had

0.5 ha, 32.5% still had 1 ha while 14.5% had 2 ha and 2.4% increased their land size up to 3 ha. The table further shows that, those who had 2 ha of land before were 26 (31.3%) but 25 (30.1%) of them had only 1 ha during the crisis and only 1 ha (1.2%) person still had up to 2 ha during the crisis.

Also for respondents with 3 ha before the crisis were 15 persons (18.1%), out of which 1 person (1.2%) now have 1 ha, 9 persons (10.8%) had 2 ha of land for farming, while the remaining 5 persons (6.0%) still had up to 3 ha during the crisis. This implies that the various changes in the land size available to various farmers changed down wards as a result of the crisis. This result is in agreement with that of Best (2011) who observes that in conflict situations farmers are forced to migrate and abandoned their houses and farm lands and move to another area or go to stay with relatives in town, where they find it difficult to have access to land for crop production and other agricultural activities.

Table 5: Farm size (hectare) before the crisis and during the crisis in 2011 (ha)

			Farm Size (hectare) during the crisis in 2011				Total
			0.5	1	2	3	
Farm size (hectare) before the crisis in 2011	1	Count of	1	27	12	2	42
		% of Total	1.2%	32.5%	14.5%	2.4%	50.6%
	2	Count of	0	25	1	0	26
	% of Total	0%	30.1%	1.2%	0%	31.3%	
	3	Count of	0	1	9	5	15
	% of Total	0%	1.2%	10.8%	6.0%	18.1%	
Total		Count of	1	53	22	7	83
	% of Total		1.2%	63.9%	26.5%	8.4%	100.0%

Source: Field work, 2012.

Table 6 reveals the prices of some major crops cultivated before the crisis in 2011 and during the crisis. The higher the value of the difference the

higher the effect of the crisis on the price of that crop as can be seen from Table 6. The price of sorghum was ₦50 before the crisis and increased to ₦150, onion from ₦1500 to ₦4000 among others. The increased in the prices could be the reduction in the number of the producers since most of them have migrated due to the persistent crisis in the area and most of the agricultural products are grossly inadequate coupled with high demand of the products. The findings is in agreement with that of Abubakar (2006) who opines that out migration leads to drastically reduced food production and reduced household wealth with consequences of increased vulnerability in many rural areas leading to food insecurity and increased in prices of agricultural products.

Table 6: Prices of some major crops before and during the crisis in 2011

Crop	Unit per one	Prices before the crisis (₦) in 2011	Prices during the crisis (₦) in 2011	Difference in Naira (₦)
Cowpea	Mudu (1.13kg)	55	100	- 81.8
Sorghum	Mudu(1.13kg)	50	150	- 200
Groundnut	Mudu(1.13kg)	70	100	- 42.8
Millet	Mudu(1.13kg)	30	80	- 166.6
Maize	Mudu(1.13kg)	25	60	- 140
Pepper	Mudu(1.13kg)	120	220	- 83.3
Acha	Mudu(1.13kg)	60	220	- 266.6
Soybean	Mudu(1.13kg)	35	70	- 100
Onion	Daro(25.34kg)	1500	4000	- 166.6

Source: Interview of marketers, August, 2012.

The result on the effect of conflict on crop production is shown in Table 7. Almost all the variables except two were perceived as effects of crises on crop production in the study area. These variables include migration of farmers hence reducing farmers population ($M=2.57$), loss of lives and injuries sustained from violent conflict which affect farm labour ($M=2.46$), inadequate food for the family ($M=2.45$), increase in poverty

($\mathcal{M}=2.45$), fear of being attacked which hinders the activities of agricultural extension service delivery ($\mathcal{M}=2.44$), destruction of property ranging from residential and farm houses, market premises, farm inputs and crop produce ($\mathcal{M}=2.35$), inaccessible roads to the farm due to fear of being attack by the enemies ($\mathcal{M}=2.35$), scarcity of food items ($\mathcal{M}=2.28$), lack of proper care of crops in the field (tillage) ($\mathcal{M}=2.22$), interrupted dependent education ($\mathcal{M}=2.21$), reduction in farm output ($\mathcal{M}=2.20$), unable to repay loan for agricultural production ($\mathcal{M}=2.20$), change in pattern of crops cultivated ($\mathcal{M}=2.18$), outbreak of diseases ($\mathcal{M}=2.17$), reduction in the production of some crop varieties like maize, millet, sorghum for easy visibility ($\mathcal{M}=2.16$), inadequate planting materials ($\mathcal{M}=2.14$), distortion in prices of agricultural goods ($\mathcal{M}=2.13$), late planting ($\mathcal{M}=2.12$), premature harvest and abandonment of crops in the field ($\mathcal{M}=2.04$), occupational mobility ($\mathcal{M}=2.01$) while increase in criminal activities and stealing of crop produce and livestock ($\mathcal{M}=1.92$) and poisoning of water and crops ($\mathcal{M}=1.83$) were considered as not serious effect. This implies that the crises have caused a lot of damage to the farmers and their agricultural products which need to be addressed.

The result is in agreement with Obioha (2005) who opines that in northeastern Nigeria, various violent conflicts over land resources have led to decrease in agricultural production. The clashes between various ethnic groups, occupational and resident groups usually result in the destruction of farmlands and consequent destruction of crops. In some cases this is followed by retaliative actions by cultivators including killing of livestock owned by the herdsmen. All these hamper the overall production of food crops and animals. This implies increased hunger, diseases and malnutrition.

Table 7: Mean distribution of effect of civil disturbances on crop production

Effects	Mean	Std. Deviation
Inadequate food for the family	2.45*	0.630
Increase poverty	2.45*	0.590
Loss of lives and injuries sustained from violent conflict which affect farm labour	2.46*	0.548
Migration of farmers hence reducing farmers population	2.57*	0.588
Reduction in the production of some crop species such as maize, millet and sorghum for easy visibility	2.16*	0.657
Destruction of property ranging from residential and farm houses, market premises, farm inputs and crop produce	2.35*	0.553
fear of being attacked which hinders the activities of agricultural extension service delivery	2.44*	0.499
Increase in criminal activities and stealing of crop produce and livestock	1.92	0.742
Distortion in price of agricultural goods	2.13*	0.643
Reduction in farm output	2.20*	0.597
occupational mobility	2.01*	0.721
Interrupted dependent education	2.21*	0.632
Scarcity of food items	2.28*	0.528
Unable to repay loan for agricultural production	2.20*	3.581
Late planting	2.12*	0.753
Premature harvest	2.04*	0.715
Abandonment of crops in the field	2.04*	0.689
Poisoning of water and crops	1.83	0.848
Inadequate planting materials	2.14*	0.627
Lack of proper care of crops in the field(tillage)	2.22*	0.592
Outbreak of diseases	2.17*	0.755
Inaccessible roads to the farm due to fear of being attack by the enemies	2.35*	0.614
Change in pattern of crops cultivated	2.18*	0.650

Source: Field work, August, 2012

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that 'ethno religious' violence in the area has reached un precedential levels and hundreds have been killed with much more wounded or displaced from their homes on account of their ethnic or religious identification. Schooling for children has been disrupted and interrupted, business lost millions of naira, property worth much more destroyed and agricultural extension service delivery hampered. It is recommended that extension agents should seek to provide research-based information on disputed issues and how to manage them. Also, opportunities should be created to employ idle youths who are available tools for use in times of conflict, such as the opening of farm centers assisted by agricultural extension agents where they can be engaged on a prescribed fee, that will keep them busy and they will also have something to take care of their basic needs. Similarly, seedlings and other farm input ought to be given to farmers who have lost all through agricultural extension agents in order for them to go back to farming, which is their only occupation.

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