

# Contemporaneity War Artefacts of Fulani Herdsmen: Mapping Behavioural Footprints, Weapons used and Communities Vulnerable to Attacks in Nigeria

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper summarizes five years (2012 to 2016) data that maps types of Fulani herdsmen weapons sub-divided into (cultural artefacts weapons, fire, and modern fire power) used, and their characteristic behavioural footprints also sub-divided into (profiled attacks on human dignity, attacks on economic resources and physical properties). It crystallizes into communities that (Christian, Muslim and Non-faith) were more vulnerable to Fulani attacks. The research uses secondary methodology to gather data, and triangulate qualitative and quantitative methods to present the data and subsequently adopts thematic and content research analytical technique to systematically analyze every fragment of the data to answer the stated research questions. The result suggest that most Nigerian Christians believe Muslim Fulani attacks are deliberate attempt by the ethnic group to forcefully establish their presence across Christian communities in Nigeria aided by the fact that their kith and kin hold sway across all Nigerian security apparatus, at the moment. The evidence suggest that within the five years under consideration 807 communities were attacked and of these 680(84%) were in the Christian communities as against 86(11%) and 41(5%) in the Muslim and non-faith communities. Also, profile of their criminal behaviour suggests that the Fulani herdsmen were more likely to be associated with attacks on economic resources followed by attacks on human dignity. The data showed that in five years 416 different behavioural footprint were carefully and chronologically profiled across all the communities and of this 146(35%) were against human dignity whilst 152(37%) were profiled against attacks on economic resources and 118(28%) were against physical properties. The herdsmen were more likely to loot,

destroy farms, and steal money including live stocks. To achieve this however, herdsmen used the three various forms of weapons, noted above, 528 times. They used their cultural artefacts weapons 374 times representing (71%), modern fire power 144 times representing (27%) and fire 10 times representing (2%). Therefore they were more likely to use their traditional cultural Fulani artefact weapons to attack victims and communities, attack Christian communities rather than any other, and their dominant behavioural footprint was attacking economic resources.

**Keywords:** Cultural Artefacts, Human Dignity, Christian, Muslim, Non-Faith, Modern Fire Power

## INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the contemporaneity war Artefacts of Muslim Fulani herdsmen demonstrated in their behavioural footprints, weapons used and communities more likely to be attacked in contemporary Nigeria. It specifically maps obvious evidence reflected in their weapons and footprints observed after each attacks in communities across Nigeria from 2012 to 2016. It also allows the researcher to systematically compare between attacks carried out in non-faith, Christian and Muslim communities in the south and northern regions of Nigeria (Keman, 2014; p.47-50; Salter, 2013; p.12-35). The central objective is to develop and present data that relevant Nigeria national security agency such as Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Army (NA), Nigeria Police force (NPF), and Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA) can harness in redefining local, regional and national security infrastructure architecture. Other agencies that would benefit from the outcome of this paper are Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) whilst public policy makers within the legislative and executive arms of government at state and national levels could use the results as guide to the formulation of new public policies.

Furthermore, practical element of these data encourages relevant Nigerian security agencies to actively undertake forensic analysis of empirical evidence scattered all across various communities that have experienced Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks. This would be done by relying on evidence like bullet cartridges on the scene and bullet pallet extracted from bodies of both injured and dead victims including those recovered on the crime scene.

The views of classical and realists schools on causes of crime are debated to theoretically underpin the research. Consequently the paper elaborates deeper into the concept of war artefacts of Muslim Fulani herdsmen, followed by the concept of profiling criminal behavioural footprints after attacks including debates on communities more vulnerable to their attacks supported with data tables, and their implications to contemporary Nigeria security infrastructure. Finally, the results of this paper will help security agencies draw incontrovertible conclusion that anywhere such evidence of weapons, behavioural footprints and communities are recurrently gathered across the country could possibly suggest that Muslim Fulani herdsmen might be responsible rather than any other regular conventional armed bandits.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The paper uses secondary methodology to gather data and information initially collected from empirical sources which are re-analysed to answer the stated research questions. Case study research design undertakes a contextual study of various phenomena presented and objectively considers and interprets views expressed about each case study situation (De Vaus; 2001; p.4-15). Yin (2013) asserts that case study design undertakes critical review of issues or phenomena, such as type of weapons and footprints including vulnerable communities to Fulani herdsmen attacks, and identifies their dominance in five years (2012 to 2016) across Nigeria. Comparative design adopted allows the researcher to systematically compare a summary of each case study of Fulani herdsmen attacks from 2012 to 2016 across Nigeria to draw an informed conclusion on which element is was most dominant (Keman, 2014; p.47-60; Salter, 2013; p.10-41). This approach informed the qualitative presentation of data using triangulation of thematic and content research analytical technique to systematically analyze every fragment of the data to achieve the stated research objectives. This research paper proposes three fundamental questions;

### **Research Questions**

1. Are there specific kinds of weapons used by the Fulani herdsmen in executing their attacks across Nigeria?
2. What is unique in the manner and behavioural footprint Fulani herdsmen exhibit and demonstrate against their victims in the theatre of attacks?

3. Can a conclusive pattern be established identifying the communities more vulnerable to Fulani herdsmen attacks?

### Context of Study

This research assumed a broad national outlook covering the 37 states in Nigeria as its study area. It particularly focuses on the security sector which has experienced divergent regional attacks, in the last twenty years, from such groups as Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Oriola, 2016) and, Ahl al-sunna or Jama' atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awatiw'al-Jihad movement meaning, "Western education is forbidden or a sin" which became Boko Haram (Mustapha, 2014; Kabir, 2014). However, the worst of these degenerating security situations is currently anchored at the door step of Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks that killed many innocent Nigerians across the country and arguably this development has assumed a catastrophic trend in the last six years, especially the last 27 months (Kazeem, 2017). Historical evidence suggest that anytime a new security threat emerges in Nigeria it quickly assumes a frightening dimension creating a new paradigm shift from others, arguably explaining why Fulani herdsmen killers are currently more dreaded than Boko Haram (Jatto, 2017a; Kazeem, 2017; Jolayemi, 2017). It is estimated that Nigeria will have a population of about 191,940,568 million people by the end of 2017 up from the 166.2 million figure declared in 2012 by the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics, which then, represented about 268% rise from the 45.2 million it was at independence in 1960 (World Population review, 2017).

Some commentators argued that Nigeria population figures are manipulated for political and economical interest in favour of some regions like the North to get more federal monetary allocations (Falola, 1998; p.305), despite the fact that a huge part of northern Sahel has been deserted by people due to desertification, skewed figures suggest that they probably have the largest population (Grainger, 2013). Contrary to this, natural geographic evidence and high maternal and child mortality death rate before age ten (Olumide *et al.*, 2009) partly explains why the north cannot be more populated than the green belt and coastal southern Nigeria regions (Jognston, 2003; Ogbonna *et al.*, 2017), which deconstructs Niven (1971; p.34) and Ekanem's (2000) previous assertions. In fact Cohen and Bledsoe (1993) argued that the more sedentary Fulani

population around the West African axis is in sharp decline due to infertility and diseases amongst the productive age group. Instructively, the British have continually been blamed for these distortions and continued contradictory figures (Geary, 2013; p.141-144). According to Obi (2013) and Agbu (2004) such contradictory debate, arguably, extends to majority of Nigeria's security infrastructure which has not witnessed any significant changes either in human resource recruitment or provision of adequate technologically driven equipment and training opportunities. This is largely caused by ineffective and corrupt political and senior military officers (Howe, 2001). Disagreeing with both points however, Okeke *et al.*, (2014) opined that indeed Nigeria government has improved the operational capability of the armed forces through new military acquisitions. Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones comprising south-east, south-south, south-west, middle-belt, north-east and north-west zones (Azikiwe, 2013).

Research data suggest that Muslim Fulani herdsmen have criss-crossed the length and breadth of Nigeria, mostly in search of greener pastures for their herds (Jatto, 2017a) but their terrorist tendencies has taken an alarming posturing in the last eight years (2009-2017) with particular focus on the last five years (2012-2015). These non-state actors like Boko Haram, Niger Delta Militants and Fulani herdsmen have deployed different small arms and light weapons like rocket launchers, automatic machine guns, use of chemicals (acid), bows and arrows, armoured personal carriers (APC), gun boats, and even quad motor bikes to mention a few (Jatto, 2017a; Rustad *et al.*, 2011; Akinola, 2017). However, evidence suggest that the Niger Delta militants fighting against socio-economic injustices, and Boko Haram Islamic terrorist motivated by religious desires to create an Islamic caliphate in north-eastern Nigeria have been seemingly contained within each zone by the Nigerian security forces (Akinola, 2017).

Quite unfortunately, Azikiwe (2013) argued supported by Jatto (2017a) that the Nigerian security apparatus has deliberately failed or refused to contain the rampaging Fulani herdsmen who have unarguably killed more innocent Nigerians, between 2012 and 2016, than any other group and thus they have demonstrated to pose dangerous threats to contemporary security in Nigeria. This is one element that has motivated this research study to undertake a precise mapping of the types of weapons the Fulani herdsmen use, behavioural profiling during attacks, and mapping of communities more

vulnerable within the time under review. Fulani herdsmen have instilled devastating and terrorising fear in the hearts and minds of sedentary Nigerians, across all social classes especially the farming populations, educational and university institutions and therefore are of strategic security threat to Nigeria (Jatto, 2017a; Ekwensi, 1990; Sani, 2007; Bergstresser, 2017). According to Hagher (2016) Fulani herdsmen terrorists' antecedence are common across other West African countries such as Ghana, Mali and Senegal suggesting and signalling the urgency why Nigeria authorities must recalibrate its human and infrastructural security architecture. In sharp contrast however, Ahmed (2013; p.131-134) argued that violence and terror activities goes both ways and the Fulani should not be blamed for self defence. The reasonable question therefore is when and where can a legally acceptable line separating self defence and terrorism be drawn in?

### **Classical and Realist Crime and Security Debate**

These models further underpin the contemporaneity of Fulani war artefacts and their behavioural footprints during attacks to determine whether it is their innate way of life or their violence is influenced by emerging environmental realities around the herdsmen which aligns with the positivist school of crime that criminal behaviours were due partly or completely to factors outside the control of individuals (Maahs and Vito, 2012). On the other hand Maahs and Vito (2012) stressed that since humans were rational beings they choose criminal acts based on the potential benefits they would derive from it which agrees with classical school of violence and war. Thus, perpetrators deliberately ignore the fact that statutory punishment for crimes outweigh the temporary satisfaction and benefits (Finley, 2011) which validates the postulations of the classical school of criminology that swift and tough punishment is one sure element of retributive justice (Gibson, 2007). Also the existence of regional microcosm sub-systems, as objects of security analysis offers analytical framework for addressing systems understanding that complex interactions were normal and integral occurrences within a diverse geopolitical and geographical system (Buzan *et al.*, 1998), a case of Nigeria. Despite the Fulani herdsmen demonstrating element of classical theory in undertaking heinous violence against innocent Nigerians it is not clear as to why relevant authorities do not adhere to the classical concept of swift and

tough punishment strategy to deter future occurrences as suggested by Gibson, (2007).

The inactivity of Nigerian authorities give credence to the argument and postulation of Abraham Jatto (2017a; Eweka, 2017; Olaniyan, 2017) that these Fulani herdsmen attacks are been sponsored by highly placed Fulani politicians assisted by their kith and kin who dominate and hold sway across the Nigerian armed forces circle. Also the realists' school argued that the pattern and nature of Fulani herdsmen attacks across hinterland communities in Nigeria negates the essence of realistic security anchored on the maximisation of military power primarily by the state demonstrated in its ability to develop strong internal and external defense defined by the arsenal of weapons and recruitment and training of troops for war (Barnett, 2001; Banlaoi, 2010). On this note the Fulani herdsmen attacks should be blamed on the Nigerian state given that both theories are state-centric and arguably have elements of their essence in anarchism (Barnett, 2001). The failure and refusal of the State to protect and guarantee the security of its citizens, results in a complete redirection of choices and freedom from the state towards groups and individuals as the foci of security (Abbass, 2005) which explains why victims of such attacks take up arms in self defense. It can be argued that government is constituted to address crime committed against innocent persons therefore, the terrorists atrocities of Fulani herdsmen across Nigeria is not influenced by factors outside their control because the government can address such factors, but are outcomes of a rationalised behaviour informed by the potential benefits they derived from such acts validating Maahs and Vito (2012) postulations.

### **Weapons Artefacts of Muslim Fulani Herdsmen**

The term artefacts represent many things to different people and situations whilst some believe it represents a people's cultural heritage reflecting beautify and traditions (Adebiyi, 2009). Others argued that the concept represent war weapons, music, domestic arts and writings culturally unique to ethnic groups used for intra-ethnic interactions and the larger society (Bruce, 2009). The term, according to Merrian-Webster (as cited in Musto and Gardiner, 2015; p.45) is also referred to as a simple object such as weapon or tool made by a people in the past and indeed extends to automobiles and buildings. In slight contrast Hobson (2004) and Webb (2012) opined that artefacts were objects made by human beings, typically items of cultural and

historical interest. Most of the weapons traced to the Fulani herdsmen used to attack innocent Nigerian farmers and some element of the security forces identifies as integral cultural heritage of the group (Jatto, 2017a; Web, 2012). This assertion agrees with Fox (as cited in Kennedy *et al.*, 1982; p.56-57) declaration that all artefacts, simple or complex, represented continuity from the past. Within this context therefore the Fulani war artefacts as identified by Ramsey (2016) are swords (called gladius and pila) including heavy javelin pole like weaponry (called az-zalayah) designed for throwing and to pierce an enemy, and short spear (called hasta) made of hard wood and pointed with a forged iron tip used in certain stages of battle lines strategies. Although these weapons originated from the Romanic times they were adopted and became widely used by other tribes and religious groups around the world including the nomadic Fulani pastoralist who migrated into Nigeria (Danver, 2015; Rich and Roeder, 2009).

Also, rifles captured from the French or purchased from coastal traders supported by gunsmiths were included as their primary artefacts of war (Hiskett, 1975), which they currently use in undertaking contemporary attacks against innocent Nigerians. Instructively the Fulani realised that the horses which formed traditional weapon of war in the open Savannah Jihad cannot be used to penetrate the forest and mangrove in the south because of diseases and density of the forests (Diamond, 2013). Historically, the Fulani pastoralist used these war artefacts during their Islamic battles and during hunting activities and expeditions on horsebacks (Ramsey, 2016). These weapons gradually became inculcated and accustomed into their main stream war artefacts which have been used to attack innocent Nigerians till this day.

This paper argues that, understanding such obvious facts can lead authorities to trace these weapons to their sources and in the process resolve many criminal and murder cases across communities who may have come in direct contact with these herdsmen thus answering research question one that there are specific cultural weapons unique to the Fulani herdsmen. Sequel to the above Reid (2012) argued that there has been a dramatic shift in the use of cultural war weapons and practice of war by the Fulani ethnic group across West Africa especially Nigeria. This can partly be traced to their adoption of modern military war arsenals like AK47, automatic riffles and guns which have also been traced to attacks they have perpetrated against innocent Nigerian victims, and Reid (2012) concluded by asserting that this shift in weapon



deployment is traced to states and non-state actors across Africa. This crystallizes the central idea of this paper which explores the mix and gradual shift between cultural and modern weaponry of Fulani herdsmen to form contemporaneity war artefacts in Nigeria which answers research question two indicating the uniqueness in the manner and behavioural footprint Fulani herdsmen exhibit against their victims.

Hagher (2016) argued that such belligerent behaviour of the herdsmen frighten sedentary farmers from carrying out their legitimate farming activities and should this be the norm it has the possibility of instigating catastrophic human insecurity in the affected states and Nigeria (Jatto, 2017c). Abraham Jatto rightly argued this in his book *"Sustainable Construction and Human Security in Sub-Saharan Africa"* (2017c). Shue (2005; p.142) posed three fundamental ethical questions concerning the *"justification of the resort to war, conduct of war, and the relationship between the resort to a war and limits of its conduct"* informed by the fact that war is always wrong since wars kill and maim human beings, destroy human artefacts, and devastate the natural environment. Accordingly, the proposed questions are when, if ever, is one either allowed or obligated to resort to war? Assuming resort to war is ever justified, what are the limits to its conduct and how it is fought? Do the limits to a war necessarily justifies a just warfare or certain situations might arise that these limits may justifiably be ignored? (Shue, 2005). Directing these war assumptions towards the atrocities committed by Muslim Fulani herdsmen against innocent Nigerians, in the last five years (2012-2016), it becomes clearer that their actions agrees with the classical school of thought that since the Fulani herdsmen are rational beings they choose criminal acts based on the potential benefits they stand to gain from it (Maahs and Vito, 2012). However, the classical views converges with the realist argument in this case were it emerges that the Nigerian state refuses to take definite tough and swift punitive measures against the Fulani perpetrators (Gibson, 2007) and therefore has failed to protect and guarantee the security of its citizens (Abbass, 2005; Barnett, 2001). Broadly, the roots of these Fulani terrorists crimes points more to economic survival, but there are plenty of evidence that suggest that there is political undertone driving it from another angle since the government have deliberately refused to arrest and jail the perpetrators or visit affected communities with relief materials and perpetually secure them from any further attacks (Jatto, 2017a; Eweka, 2017). It is also argued that the Fulani dominated security

agencies with the approval of Fulani politicians are clandestinely arming and spreading their religious and ethnic kinsmen across Nigeria to represent votes and perhaps demonstrate a show of force in non traditional areas of the country where there might be problems during coming general elections (Jatto, 2017a; Jatto and Stanislas, 2017b). One characteristics of the Fulani mercenaries is the bold display of all manner of weapons like double edge swords, bow and arrows, machetes, knives and short guns along with the notable AK-47 automatic assault rifle prior to any attacks (Sandra and Oyiyeipo *et al.*, 2016; Emeni, 2012; Bergstresser, 2015; p.131-147). This is consistent with Web (2012; Ramsey, 2016) assertions about Fulani cultural war artefacts.

Usually, the actual killers deployed are the younger Fulani boys who are enlisted as escorts and mercenaries whose job is just to kill (Kingdom News Journal, 2016). ADAPHAI concluded that; *“Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria has what they called ‘Fulani Standing Army of Occupation (FSAO) who they call upon anytime there is hostility between them and their host communities”* (Olaniyan, 2017). This assertion resonate with the confessions made by some youths at Ukpe community in Ogoja, Cross Rivers State, after 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2016 attacks on the community, that; *‘the herdsmen are well armed and scary quite different from the once we used to know’* (Brain News, 2016). Meaning, they might be strange Fulani possibly mercenaries whose job is just to kill a pre-determined target of people (Kingdom News Journal, 2016). Also, Dr. Dale Oluwatade, former Chairman of Youth wing of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) described the herdsmen killing approach as a *‘Fulani Multinational Hostility Program’* (FMHP) designed as a Multinational genocide force made up of ‘deregulated militant military youths’ who take orders from their leaders above (Eweka, 2017). Underpinning this description of Muslim Fulani herdsmen as, ‘Multinational’ is the fact that empirical evidence suggests that their membership consists of Fulani herdsmen from other surrounding West African countries led by Nigerian herdsmen, which explains the ease and boldness with which they navigate around Nigeria.

It is therefore unarguable, with mounting empirical evidence, that Fulani herdsmen have actually demonstrated the characteristics of a standing army, ready to kill and occupy other people’s territories at will (Olaniyan, 2017), whilst also reflecting the capacity of a Multinational genocide force (Eweka, 2017). For instance, after the killing of over 500 people in a Christian Community in Agatu, Benue State on 29<sup>th</sup> February 2016, the Fulani herdsmen

finally occupied their community after successfully launching further attacks which kept the remaining villagers away due to fear (Agang, 2016). This is consistent with the historical behaviour of the Muslim Fulani herders who forcefully took over the territories of their host in Jalonke community and the territories of their Hausa host in northern Nigeria after bloody insurrections and Jihad (Umaru, 2013; Tordoff and Fage, 2013). But it must be emphasised that these attacks are not exactly one way. There have been occasions where members of some host communities carried out reprisal due to provocations from Fulani herdsmen (Omilusi, 2016; Mikailu, 2016). Sometimes cattle belonging to Fulani herdsmen are stolen by organised criminal groups which have provoked extremely deadly reactions and subsequent attacks against many farming communities, who are usually the first line of suspect (Akinwotu, 2017). Despite these odd occurrences it does not justify the spread of killing atrocities by Fulani herdsmen.

Comparatively, the foot prints defining herdsmen pattern of attacks are not new nor limited to herdsmen alone when compared with the 1980-1984 Islamic insurgency of Maitatsine, meaning "the one who damns", in Hausa (Pumphrey and Barcott, 2003; p.265-270) and atrocities committed during the Nigerian 1967-70 civil war (Momoh, 2000). But the consistency in the kind of barbarity and callousness attending each of their contemporary attacks has never been the worst in post 1999 conflicts in contemporary Nigeria (Mickolus, 2016; p.353). Arguably, the dreaded Niger Delta militants, who sometimes abducted people during their struggles (Nsima, 2011; p.190-193), did not demonstrate such level of absurdity and recklessness to human lives (Dibie, 2014), rather the law enforcement agents were blamed for such atrocities (Dibie, 2014). Although Amanyie (2001) disagreed with this conclusion, but there are no accounts or empirical evidence which suggested that the Niger Delta militants killed women and children (Ikpe, 2014; p.87-103; Mickolus, 2016) in such dastardly manners which the Fulani herdsmen have done as correctly recorded in Human Rights Watch (2017) and Nigeria Watch (2016) documentations.

Obviously validating the suggestions of Vormbaum and Akinmuwagun (2014) that; Fulani herdsmen attacks reflected high level of forethoughts and organisation and not a mere spontaneous reaction based on provocations from host communities (Ahmed, 2013). Otherwise, the level of coordination, particularly the methodological and clinical disappearance, after each attack is

curious (Ahema, 2015). The complicity of the current Nigerian Federal government seen in the professionally skewed approach with which the federal investigation team of Nigeria Police swiftly arrested five suspects, in South of Nigeria, within five days, who they alleged killed one Fulani police officer and his aid in Rivers State (Omonobi and Onoyume, 2016). It is therefore curious why this same police team could not use footprint profiling to arrest any Fulani herdsmen who may have taken part in the killing of over 500 villagers in Agatu, Benue state within the same time period (Jatto, 2017a).

This paper has successfully mapped the various weapons reported in the public to have been used at each and every attack across the 37 states in Nigeria in the last five years (2012-2016) and the results shown on the table below suggest that these weapons are consistent with those historically and traditionally described as war artefacts of the Fulani pastoralists (Ramsey, 2016 Hiskett, 1975). Although they have adopted some new automatic weapons such as AK47, evidence suggest that they deploy such modern weapons when they want to maximise the casualty rate of victims (Sandra and Oyiyepe *et al.*, 2016; Reid, 2012). Instructively therefore, three tables and charts below represents three sectors/themes (weapons, behavioural profile and communities more vulnerable to attacks). The first two of these themes are divided into three sub-themes categories were each sub-themes evidentially examines components unique to that category. This allows the research to drill down deeper and put the result in specific perspectives like never done before to elucidate on the dynamic nature and patterns that have defined Fulani herdsmen war currently ravaging communities across contemporary Nigeria.

**Table 1: Mapping Summary of Weapons Used in Attacks 2012-2016**

STATES		YEARS				
S/N		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>MAPPING NATURE OF WEAPONS USED IN ATTACKS</b>						
1.	Abia	Machetes, knives,	Local pistols, machetes, knives	Guns, machetes, knives	Guns, knives, machetes	Machetes, bow/arrow, guns
2.	Adamawa	AK47, machetes, guns	AK47, machetes, guns	Bow/arrows, machetes, guns	Guns, Machetes	Ak47,Guns, Machetes
3.	Akwa Ibom	Guns, machetes, knives	Knives, machetes	Gun, machetes,	AK47, machetes	Machetes, knives
4.	Anambra	Machetes, sticks, knives	Knives, machetes	Machetes, sticks, bow/arrows	Machetes, sticks, bow/arrows	AK-47, Machetes, knives
5.	Bauchi	Machetes, knives, bow/arrow	Machetes, knives, bow/arrow	Machetes, guns arrows	Gun, bow/arrow knives	Machetes, Dane guns, AK-47
6.	Bayelsa	Machete, knives, pistol	Machete, knives, pistol	Machete, gun, knives	Machete, gun, knives	Dane guns, machete
7.	Benue	AK47, pistols, knives, Dane guns, machetes,	AK47, Machetes, knives	Guns, machetes, knives	Ak45, machetes, knives, and guns	AK-47, guns, knives, machetes, arrows
8.	Borno	Machetes, knives, gun	Machetes, knives, gun	Bow/arrow, machete	Machetes, knives	Machetes, knives
9.	Cross Rivers	Machetes, knives, gun	Dane gun, gun, pistol	Machetes, gun, pistol	, Machetes knives	AK47, Machetes, knives
10.	Delta	Machetes, knives, gun	Machetes, knives, gun	AK47, gun, L/pistol	AK47, Dane gun, machete	AK47, Dane gun, double barrel, machete
11.	Ebonyi	Machetes, knives	Knives, machetes, gun	Machete, guns, AK47	Gun, knives, pistol	Knives, machetes, guns
12.	Edo	No record	Machetes, knives	Machetes, knives	No records	Machetes and knives
13.	Ekiti	No records	No records	Knives, machetes, gun	Knives, machetes, gun	Bow/arrow, guns, machete, swords
14.	Enugu	Machetes, knives	Machetes, knives, pistol	AK-47, Machetes, knives, arrows	AK-47, Machetes, knives, arrows	AK-47, Machetes, knives, arrows
15.	F.C.T.	Machetes, knives, bow/arrow	Machetes, knives	Dane gun, pistol, knives, machetes	Machetes, knives	AK47,guns,bow and arrows, machetes
16.	Gombe	Machetes, bow/arrow	Machetes, bow/arrow	Machete, knives, Dane gun	Bow/arrows, machete, knives	Bow/arrows, machete, knives
17.	Imo	Guns, machetes, knife	AK47, guns, knives	Machete, knives, gun	Gun, machetes	AK47,guns, machetes
18.	Jigawa	Bow & Arrow, knives, machetes	Bow & arrow, knives, machetes	Bow & arrow, knives, machetes	Bow & arrow, knives, machetes	Bow & arrow, knives, machetes, guns
19.	Kaduna	Guns,machetes,A K47,bow/arrows, fire	Guns,machetes,AK47 ,bow/arrows, fire	AK47,machete,guns	Fire,AK47,guns,knives, machetes	AK47,Machetes,guns,
20.	Kano	No records	No records	No records	No records	Gun, machete
21.	Katsina	AK47, bow & arrows, knives, machetes	AK47, bow & arrows, knives, machetes	AK47,guns, bow & arrows	AK47,guns, bow & arrows	AK47,guns, bow & arrows, spears
22.	Kebbi	No records	No records	Machetes and knives	Guns, bows/arrows, machetes	Guns, bows/arrows, machetes
23.	Kogi	Machetes, knives, guns	Bow/arrows, cutlass, knives Dane guns	Guns, machetes, knives, fire	Guns, machetes, knives, fire	Guns, machetes, knives, fire, spears
24.	Kwara	Guns and bows & arrows, machetes	Guns and bows & arrows, machetes	Guns and bows & arrows, machetes	Ak47, Dane guns, machetes, knives	Ak47, Dane guns, machetes, knives
25.	Lagos	Machetes, knives	No records	No records	Knives and machetes	Knives and machetes

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26.	Nasarawa	Machetes and knives	Bow and arrows, guns, knives	Bow and arrows, guns, knives	AK47, Dane gun, machetes, knives	AK47, Dane gun, machetes, knives
27.	Niger	No records	No records	No records	AK47, Dane guns, machetes	AK47, Dane guns, machetes
28.	Ogun	Machetes, knives and guns	Machetes, knives and guns	Ak47, guns, machetes	Knives, guns	AK47, guns and machetes
29.	Ondo	Machetes, knives	Machetes, knives	Dane gun, machete	Machete, knives, gun	Machete, knives, gun, spears
30.	Osun	No records	No records	No records	No records	AK47, machetes, knife
31.	Oyo	Dane gun, machetes	Machete, knives, gun	Machete, knives, gun	Ak47, bow/arrows	AK47, machetes, guns
32.	Plateau	Machetes, knives, gun	Machetes, knives, AK47	AK47, bow/arrow, machetes, fire	AK47, bow/arrow, machetes, fire	AK47, machetes, Dane guns, fire
33.	Rivers	No records	Machetes, knives	Machetes, knives, gun	No records	Guns, machetes
34.	Sokoto	Bow/arrow, knives	Bow/arrows, knives	Machetes, knives	Machetes, knives	No records
35.	Taraba	Bow/arrow, guns, machetes	Ak47, guns, machetes	Fire, machetes, guns, Ak47	AK47, machetes, knives	AK47, machetes, knives, spears
36.	Yobe	No records	No records	No records	Machetes, knives	No records
37.	Zamfara	Machetes, knives, Dane guns	Bow/arrows, knives, guns, machetes	Machetes, guns, knives	G3 rifles, machetes, local pistols, bow/arrow, Ak47	G3 rifles, machetes, local pistols, bow/arrow Ak47


**Sources:** Extracted and compiled by the author from secondary sources; Nigeria News papers, Nigeria Watch/ IFRA-Nigeria, Human Right Watch, Nigeria Weekly Security Report, SB Morgen, Amnesty International, Global Terrorism Index (GTI), and United States -OSAC reports 2012-2016 used in the texts but the data are not exhaustive.

### Data Interpretation and Analysis

The weapons category is divided into three components such as; cultural artefact weapons, fire as weapon and modern fire power which forms the underpinning bases for profiling and calculating the summary of the types of weapons Fulani herdsmen mostly used during attacks across Nigeria in five years 2012 to 2016. Weapons generally believed to be associated with Fulani pastoralist herdsmen include bows and arrows, machete, long javelin with iron pointed head, short spear, arrows, knives and Dane guns as rightly posited by Ramsey (2016); Fox, as cited in Kennedy *et al.*, 1982; Hiskett, 1975). Conversely, the modern fire power represents guns, G3 rifles, AK-47 and pistols which show that Fulani mix cultural weapons with modern once signifying a shift to contemporary weapons as suggested by Reid (2012). Finally, fire represents any arson carried out against properties and people. Table one reveals that the Fulani used three major weapons during attacks across communities in Nigeria. This answers research question one indicating that there are specific types of weapons the Fulani herdsmen used more frequently than others.

This was made possible through a careful analysis of the courses of death and injuries inflicted on the bodies of victims as observed at the various


crime scenes across the communities. The table suggests that they relied heavily on their traditional weapons of war which are quite flexible to use and does more incalculable damage to humans in the most devastating ways like using knives and machetes to mutilate bodies of victims and cut out unborn human fetus from the womb of women. A current case took place in Ore Ondo State where a male farmers' heart was cut out and placed on his chest by some suspected Muslim Fulani herdsmen (Johnson, 2017). According to the data their choice of weapon is determine by their aim on every mission either to create fear by ensuring the burning and mutilation of bodies including slitting of throats of victims or they want to reduce the population of the villagers through the use of modern fire power like AK-47, which they used in a combined total of 144 times in five years, with the intent to acquire lands (Reid, 2012). The combined data summary also suggest that in five years 2012 to 2016 the herdsmen used their traditional cultural artefact weapons 374 times with the highest of 80 recorded in 2016 which justifies Ramsey (2016) argument. They rarely used fire as a weapon because they want to loot and perhaps stay in those communities because according to the data fire was used as a weapon only 10 times from 2012 to 2016.



Summary data on figure one above vividly reveals that there has been incremental rise in the use of each weapon category because in 2012 they used their cultural artefact weapons 72 (19.25%) times, it fell to 71(19%) in 2014 due to the rise in the use of modern fire power, however it rose again to 78 (21%) and 80(21.39%) in 2015 and 2016 respectively. According to Reid (2012) the Fulani are shifting and mixing their weapons of attack with contemporary

weapons to maximise casualty levels and execute swifter operations, this assertion is validated with the rise in the use of modern fire power (AK-47, G3 rifles, double barrel and pistols). In 2012 they deployed modern fire power 15 times (10.4%) in 2013, 22 times (15.28%) in 2013 and 31 times (22%) in 2014. But in 2015 its deployment fell to 28 (19.44%) whilst increasing their traditional cultural weapons at the same time. However, in 2016 the use of modern fire power rose to 48 (33.33%) which saw many innocent people killed in Southern Kaduna, Agatu, in Benue State and States in the middle belt as well as across Nigeria which triggered national and international outcry. It is unarguable that one reason for the high deployment of modern fire power in 2014 was to kill as many people as possible just before the elections to give the Christian President a negative local and international reputation. Conversely however the rise in the use of modern weaponry in 2016 was mainly traced to their desire to forcefully acquire lands in mainly Christian and non-faith dominated communities such as Southern Kaduna, across middle belt states and other states in Southern region of Nigeria. Fire was not a major weapon but it was also sparingly used within the time under consideration with a summary of one incidence in 2012 rising to three in 2015 and only two in 2016. Therefore it could be argued that, though one category of weapons is largely used than the other two, all the weapons are differently used to fulfil different purposes like when they want quick and more numbers of victims killed they would use modern superior fire power and if they wanted to be more savagery they use more their cultural crude artefacts.

Figure 2: Summary of Percentage Number of times Weapons were used 2012-2016





Sequel to the above, figure two summarises that the Fulani deployed the components of the three categories of weapons 528 times between 2012 to 2016 when broken down their cultural weapons were deployed 374 times (71%) followed by modern fire power at 144 times (37%) whilst fire was the least used put at 10 times (2%). Therefore it is arguable that the Fulani prepared to use their traditional weapons to commit crimes against humanity because it is easier for them and hardly traceable by authorities. However, the import of this research establishes the fact that these various evidences would help security agencies understand that these atrocities were not committed by other regular armed bandits because the weapons used are consistently and akin to those traced to Fulani herdsmen.

### **Mapping and Profiling Behavioural Foot Prints of Fulani Herdsmen**

Profiling of behavioural footprints are compared between actions of Fulani herdsmen during criminal attacks to ascertain and differentiate what defines the rubrics of their common behavioural characteristics as rightly posited by Turvey (2011; Helfgott, 2008). This element of profiling aligns with Cook-Lynn (2001; p.174) assertions that Fulani herdsmen should know that crime certainly carries footprints hence a five years (2011-2016) summary of such footprints indicating Fulani herdsmen barbaric behaviours during attacks in contemporary Nigeria is captured in the table below. According to Helfgott (2008) criminal profiling infers the known traits of an offender through physical and behavioural evidences by reaching backwards in time at what actually occurred at the scene and thereafter make rational inferences based on evidence observed at the crime scene in mapping out the characteristics of the potential unknown perpetrators.

On the contrary Morewitz (2014) posited that criminal profiling is a process designed to assist law enforcement agencies in the determination of the characteristics of unknown criminal subjects and their criminal behavioural patterns. Quite specifically, criminal behavioural foot print profiling drills down on class characteristics that involves making inferences about consistent features replicate across many crime scenes (Helfgott, 2008) like raping female children to death, cutting open pregnant women and slitting the throats of victims like animals are consistent with Fulani herdsmen attack methodology. Despite the relevance of this crime solving technique however Turvey (2011) disagreed with applying deductive profiling of criminal behaviours because it

would be inherently inaccurate were the investigator relies on generalised historical survey information from a limited sample of a particular group without specifically relating such to any case whose profiles were generalised. Thus argues that the data gathered about a particular sample group and from the crime scene should inductively decide the perpetrator of a crime because of its potentials of securing a judicial conviction in a law court instead of general profiling (Turvey, 2011). The inductive approach is what this paper adopted in profiling the possible perpetrators based on real life physical evidences scattered around and about each and every community crime scene where the Fulani herdsmen may have attacked. This partly answers research question two which sort to understand the uniqueness in the manner and behavioural footprint Fulani herdsmen exhibited against their victims in the theatre of attacks. Though behavioural mapping or profiling has many advocates and has yielded commendable results, Sonne (2016; p.141) argued that the profiler must not assume anything to allow for a comprehensive forensic analysis to determine the integrity of the behaviour and the features found at the crime scene.

Criminal profiling or criminal behavioural mapping could be biased or yield the unexpected outcome aligning with Williams (2014) proposition that such methods could take nothing more than a reflection of racial, gender and cultural inclinations which are unscientific and cannot be proven. In all, many criticisms around mapping behaviours and criminal profiling have more often than not centred on the relevance and usefulness of the information profiles contained because they were exposed to some elements of bias (Kocsis, 2007). Despite these contradictions mapping physical evidence and consistent characteristics features observed in a crime scene can be verifiable and the conclusion is not limited to that drawn by one security agency alone in the case of the herdsmen attacks in Nigeria. Inherently, the physical characteristic features consistent with the traditional culture of Fulani herdsmen including the verbal and boastful confessions made about many of these crimes by group members, who were never investigated and their killing methodology (Jatto, 2017a; Reid, 2012) underpinned the collection of data. The table below shows the various physical behavioural profiles observed based on consistencies of the features replicate across many scenes of Muslim Fulani herdsmen attacks in the last five years, 2012-2016 through physical counts.

**Table 2: Five Years Summary of Behavioural Footprint during Fulani Herdsmen Attacks  
2012-2016**

STATES		YEARS				
S/N		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>MAPPING BEHAVIORAL FEATURES AND FOOTPRINTS DURING ATTACKS</b>						
1.	Abia	Destroy farms, maim	Destroy farms, maim	Destroy farms, maim	Destroy farms, main, attack village	burn farms, robbed food and money
2.	Adamawa	Throat slitting, looting live stock, burn farms	Throat slitting, looting live stock, burn farms	Throat slitting, looting live stock, burn farms	Burning villages, looting food & livestock, kidnap	Burning villages, looting food & livestock, kidnap
3.	Akwa Ibom	Destruction of crops, farm land, rape	Destruction of crops, farm land, rape	Burn cars, farms, mutilation of bodies	Burn cars, farms, mutilation of bodies	Destroyed farms, robbed money
4.	Anambra	Destroy farm crops	Destroy farm crops, houses	Destroy farm crops, houses, kidnap	Looting of shops, destroy farms & properties	Burglary, throat slitting
5.	Bauchi	Mutilate bodies, burn farms and huts, kidnap	Destroy properties, burn village, kidnap	Burnt huts and houses, kidnapping	Destroy properties, burn village, steal live stock	burning farms, houses kidnap women
6.	Bayelsa	Destroy farms & crops	Rape women, destroy crops	Rape women, destroy crops	Destroyed farms, rape	Destroyed farms, rape
7.	Benue	Rape, kidnappings, burn farms and crops	Burnt churches, houses, farms, people, kidnap	Burnt yam barns, farms, huts, houses, people, abductions	Burnt women and children, burnt farms and huts and houses	Burn huts, houses, food barns, farms
8.	Borno	Rape, kidnap, burn schools, huts & houses	Rape, kidnap, burn schools, huts & houses	Destroy farm, loot, burn huts	Burnt down villages, kidnap	Burnt down villages, kidnap
9.	Cross Rivers	Rape, burn farms & huts	Drive farmer away, burn houses and mutilation	Destroyed farm crops, attacks village	Burnt crops, destroyed farms, kidnappings	Burnt a village, kidnap, mutilated bodies
10.	Delta	Rape women, destroy farm	Rape women, destroy farm, kidnappings	Attacked church, burn farms, rape, kidnap	Killed a king, burn houses, kidnappings	Rape, burning houses, kidnappings
11.	Ebonyi	Rape, looting, robbery	Rape, looting, robbery	Destroy farms, houses	Mutilation, loot, robbery	Mutilated bodies, robbery
12.	Edo	No records	Rape, destroyed farm	Rape, burn huts, farm	No records	Rape, burning huts
13.	Ekiti	No records	No records	Rape, kidnappings	Destroy farms, rape	Destroyed farms, rape
14.	Enugu	Kidnap, rape, destroy farmland	Kidnap, rape, destroy farmland	Rape, arson, killing animals, burn farms, houses, throat slitting	Rape, arson, killing animals, burn farms, houses throat slitting	Rape, killing animals, burn farms, houses throat slitting
15.	F.C.T.	Kidnappings, destroy farmlands	Kidnappings, destroy farmlands	Destroy crops and farmlands	Destroy huts, farms, kidnap	Destroyed farms, houses
16.	Gombe	Kidnap, destroy farms	Kidnap, destroy farms	Burn huts, farms, kidnap	Burn village, farms destroyed, kidnap	Burn village, farms destroyed, kidnap
17.	Imo	Looting, kidnappings, rape, destroy farms	Rape children & women, burn farms & houses	Mutilated bodies, rape, kidnappings, destroy farms	Rape, kidnappings, looting food stuff, shops Destroy farmland	Rape children & women, burn farms & houses, kidnappings
18.	Jigawa	Destroy farms & houses	Destroy farms & houses	Destroy farms & houses	Destroy farms & houses	Destroy farms & houses
19.	Kaduna	Rape, slit throats, burn farms, killed women &	Rape, slit throats, burn farms, killed women & children,	Burn women & children, houses, farms, rape, slit throats	Burn women & children, houses, farms, rape, slit	Rape children & women, burn children, smash

**Contemporaneity War Artefacts of Fulani Herdsmen: Mapping Behavioural Footprints, Weapons used and Communities Vulnerable to Attacks in Nigeria**

		children, looting, burn shops & churches,	looting, burn shops & churches, mosques		throats	babies skulls, mutilation, burn villages and houses
20.	Kano	No records	No records	No records	No records	destroyed farms
21.	Katsina	Burn farm, huts, burnt bikes, looting	Burn farm, huts, burnt bikes, looting	Looting, destruction of farms, burnt bikes	Looting, destruction of farms, burnt bikes	Looting, destruction of farms
22.	Kebbi	No records	No records	Mutilation f bodies, destruction of farms	Mutilation f bodies, destruction of farms	Mutilation f bodies, destruction of farms
23.	Kogi	Destroy farms, burn villages and people	Destroy farms, burn villages and people	Robberies, stealing food and destruction of farms	Robberies, stealing food and destruction of farms	Burn farms, village, people
24.	Kwara	Destroyed Farms crops	Destroyed farm crops	Mutilated bodies, destroyed crops, burn houses	Mutilated bodies, destroyed crops, burn houses	Rape, burn houses and farms including people
25.	Lagos	Burning cars, looting	No records	No records	Mutilation, burning cars	Burning cars, buildings
26.	Nasarawa	Destruction of houses, burning of farms	Rape, burning farms, mutilation and looting	Burning livestock, shops, villages, rape	Rape, burning farms, mutilation and looting	Rape, burning farms, mutilation and looting
27.	Niger	No records	No records	No records	Burnt cars, bikes, houses	Destroyed farms, burnt houses
28.	Ogun	Destruction of farms	Loot food stuffs and money	Loot food stuffs and money	Rape, burn cars and houses	Rape, burn cars and houses
29.	Ondo	Destroy farms, loot food	Destroy farms, loot food	Burn houses, farms	Burn houses, farms	Rape, burn farm and loot
30.	Osun	No records	No records	No records	No records	Looting, burn farms
31.	Oyo	Destroy farms and hut	Destroy farms and hut	Crops destroyed	Looting shops, live stocks	7 hours spent, stole 500,000 Naira cash,
32.	Plateau	Burn churches, farms, houses, cars, rape women, girl child, loot	Burn churches, farms, houses, cars, rape women, girl child, loot	Burn churches, farms, houses, cars, rape women, girl child, loot	Burn churches, farms, houses, cars, rape women, girl child, loot	Burn churches, farms, houses, cars, rape women, girl child, loot
33.	Rivers	No records	Rape of women, destruction of farms	Rape of women, destruction of farms	No records	Rape of women, destruction of farms
34.	Sokoto	Destroy crops, injuries	Destroy crops, injuries	Injuries from fight	Destruction of farm crop	No records
35.	Taraba	Rape women and girl child, burn farms and looting	Looting, burn farm barns, rape women, kill children	Looting, burn farm barns, rape women, kill children	Burn Catholic church, houses, domestic animals, people, rape	Burn Catholic church, houses, domestic animals, people, rape
36.	Yobe	No records	No records	No records	Burnt churches, raided homes, burnt properties	No records
37.	Zamfara	Burn huts and houses, bikes, destroy farms	Burn huts and houses, bikes, destroy farms	Burn churches, house, loot live stocks/food	Burn churches, houses, farms and bikes	Burn churches, houses, farms and bikes

**Sources:** Extracted and compiled by the author from secondary sources; Nigeria News papers, Nigeria Watch/ IFRA-Nigeria, Human Right Watch, Nigeria Weekly Security Report, SB Morgen, Amnesty International, Global Terrorism Index (GTI), and United States -OSAC reports 2012-2016 used in the texts but the data are not exhaustive


### Data Interpretations and Analysis

Therefore, profiling the criminal behavioural footprints of Fulani herdsmen attacks was divided into three categories and profiled within the

rubrics of violation or attacks on human dignity (rape, kidnapping, mutilation, burning people alive and slitting people's throats) (Nigeria Watch, 2016; Human Right Watch, 2015; Amnesty International, 2016). Example of the 72 years old woman (Victoria Akinseye) who was brutally raped as well as another male farmer whose heart was cut out and placed on his chest by some Muslim Fulani herdsmen in Ore, South West Nigeria between 21<sup>st</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of August 2017 (Johnson, 2017). The calculated silence of the executive governor of Ondo state (Rotimi Akeredolu-SAN), women groups, and worse still, refusal of security agencies from saying or doing anything about such heinous crime speaks volume and lends credence to the argument why citizens should result to self defense (Jatto, 2017a; Eweka, 2017; Abbass, 2005). Other profiled Fulani herdsmen behaviours include attacks on economic resources (burning of farms, looting food stuffs, stealing money and live stock), and attacks on physical properties (arson on houses and places of worship, destruction of cars and motorbikes) which draws realistic profile picture of the feature of their behaviours during attacks (Nigeria Watch, 2016; Omilusi, 2016).

The data on profiling suggest that the criminal behavioural footprint features of Fulani herdsmen revealed in table two above showed that the herdsmen demonstrated their footprint in all components of the three categories listed above on a combined total summary of 416 times in five years. This does not suggest that they had no other character displayed in the theatre of attacks; however, the three profiles here were more visible and reoccurred countless times across many crime scenes in Nigeria. There were 34 different footprints of attacks on human dignity through rape, mutilation and throat slitting incidences on victims in 2016 than at any other time in the last five years under review which prompted national and international outcry in Nigeria and call for justice as argued by Jatto (2017a; Johnson, 2017). Surprisingly, nothing has been done and no one has ever been arrested or prosecuted for these crimes despite these footprints. This interpretation clearly answers research question two suggesting that it is possible to profile the physical features of the behavioural footprints of Fulani herdsmen that could lead relevant security agencies to scientifically investigate them relying on inductive approach which allows evidence to drive conclusions and convictions.

**Figure 3: Profiling of Behavioral Footprints during Attacks 2012-2016**



Subsequently, figure three revealed that it is possible to map the profile and criminal behavioural footprints of the Fulani herdsmen to ascertain the level these criminal activities and allegations can be attributed to them. In 2012 the pattern of their behaviour in the theatre or scene of criminality was measured by looking at three common behavioural categories of; dastardly attacks on human dignity such mutilation, rape of girl child to death cutting out unborn fetus from their mother’s wombs including. Other categories included attacks on economic resources such; stealing money and live stock, looting food stuff, burning down farms and harvest barns and finally attacks on physical properties. The result suggests that 38 (25%) attacks on economic resources were recorded in 2012 whilst 34 (23.29%) attacks against human dignity were traced and profiled in 2016. Meaning that they preferred to both steal and loot the villagers or devastate human lives in the most barbaric ways with intent to horrify and traumatise those victims who escaped alive. The shocking scenario in these data is the escalation in attacks against human dignity which increased from 25 profiled cases (17.12%) in 2012 to 31 profiled (21.23%) in 2014 but falling to 29 profiled (20%) cases in 2015 and sharply rising above all other profiled behaviour of 34 cases (23.29%) in 2016. The example of 72 years old woman (Victoria Akinseye) who was brutally raped as well as another male farmer whose heart was cut out and placed on his chest by some Muslim Fulani herdsmen in Ore, South West Nigeria between 21<sup>st</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of August 2017 are cases in point (Johnson, 2017). On the contrary, attacks on physical properties has dwindled with the lowest profile of 19 cases (16.1%) in 2012 which picked

as the highest profiled behaviour footprint in 2015 put at 31 cases (26.27%) above others but fell to 25 (21.19%) in 2016 suggesting changes.

Figure 4: Percentage Number of Times each Behavioral Profile was Recorded 2012-2016




Figure four summarises that 416 profiled criminal behavioural footprints were recorded at the scene of the crimes of attacks across communities in Nigeria between 2012 to 2016 and the findings suggests that 146 representing 35% of these profiled footprints was recorded against attacks on human dignity whilst 152 representing 37% was against attacks on economic resources. However, the least profiled case revealed that only 118 cases of behavioural footprints representing 28% were profiled against attacks on physical properties which involved burning of houses, cars, places of worship and humans. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Fulani herdsmen would rather destroy the economic capacity of a village where they are not allowed to freely graze their cattle through destruction of farms and crops, harvest barns, looting valuables including live stocks and money. Therefore communities where such is reported and evidently profiled, investigators should know that the Fulani herdsmen were most likely responsible. Instructively however, the gradual shift to destruction of human dignity could suggest that they intend to cow and intimidate sedentary ancestral residents by such barbaric human killings and take over their landed properties like they have been variously accused of doing in Jos, Benue and Southern Kaduna states (Jatto, 2017a). The question remains as to why the Federal government has deliberately refused to use these profiles and evidence to trace and arrest these groups of people causing such human and material havoc across contemporary Nigerian socio economic landscape?

## COMMUNITIES MORE EXPOSED TO FULANI HERDSMEN ATTACKS

Understanding what defines the inherent characteristics of these patterns of Fulani herdsmen attacks in contemporary Nigeria, focus should be on the Christian, Muslim and non faith communities in the South and North, including human and hardware deployed during their operations (Mickolus, 2014; p.252-255; Ahmed, 2013). The concern is whether it is by mere coincidence that many dimensions that formed the pattern of Fulani herdsmen attacks including their behaviours replicate those of Boko Haram Muslim terrorists group (Amnesty International, 2015; p.29-40). Could the Fulani herdsmen actually be the new phase of Boko Haram following the similarities in most of what constitutes the manner of their attacks as rightly alluded to in the 2015 Global Terrorism Index Report (GTI) which concluded that both groups increased terrorism in Nigeria by 300 percent in 2015 (Global Terrorism Index, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). Recently, some Fulani herdsmen arrested for killings in Wukari, Taraba State, confessed been members of Boko Haram Islamic terror group (Omonobi, 2014).

The various evidences suggest that majority of the Fulani herdsmen attacks are perpetuated against particular religious communities and when there is any variation it means that those other communities attacked are often unidentified with any dominant faith. Evidence proves that they avoid attacking their fellow Fulani communities even when such communities are physically situated amongst their target groups and the security agencies such as the Nigerian Army tacitly and sometimes openly give them support by looking the other way (Murray, 2017). The testimony of Eze Fidelis Igwe, the traditional ruler of Abbi community, a hinterland within the larger Nimbo Christian community in Uzo-Uwani Local Government Area justifies the need to map the various foot print components of Fulani herdsmen attacks in Nigeria. Eze Fidelis Igwe complained that;

*“My community has over the years suffered untold hardship in the hands of Fulani herdsmen.... accused of maiming and gang-raping ‘our women at farmlands’ in addition to robbing and kidnapping his people or stealing and destroying cash crops in the community” (Sandra and Oyiyepo et al., 2016).”*

The testimony of Eze Fidelis Igwe is another empirical evidence to rightly suggest that these herdsmen actually direct their attack methodology at



either economic resources and or including vicious attacks on human dignity as rightly shown on the data on table two and figure three above. Whichever direction the debate may swing, both Muslim Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram Muslim terrorists' attacks on innocent Nigerians have one common denominator which is forceful seizure of territories from sedentary inhabitants (Agang, 2016; p.27-33). This was the case experienced in Agatu Christian community of Benue state, where over 500 people were reported to have been massacred on February 29<sup>th</sup> 2016 in just one attack, following which they subsequently occupied the lands because the sedentary villagers were too frightened to come back to their ancestral homes (Sanda and Oyiyeipo *et al.*, 2016; Agang, 2016; p.27-33). These patterns of attacks bear many resemblances with the kinds of attacks Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad were known for (Agang, 2016; p.27-33). The only notable exception between the two groups is the fact that Boko Haram Islamic terrorists use Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and car bombs including child (girls and boys) suicide bombers (Hagher, 2015; p.123-126), which is an approach yet to be adopted by the Fulani herdsmen (Ahmed, 2013).

Some scholars argued that such incessant killings spiralling out of control across Nigeria, could lead to a vicious circle of reprisal attacks against Muslim Fulani herdsmen (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Eweka, 2017). Particularly after President Muhammadu Buhari, the grand patron of Fulani Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (Miyetti Allah) would have left office. But the worrying reality is that evidence suggests that a possible full scale reprisal attacks against Fulani herdsmen, even before Buhari leaves political office might be imminent (Ogbonna, 2017; Ochayi *et al.*, 2017). This is informed by many reverberating calls for self defense been made by many Christian leaders like Bishop Oyedepo and Apostle Suleiman, Afenifere socio-cultural Renewal Group and commentators who argue that host communities have the right to defend themselves (Ogbonna, 2017; Ochayi *et al.*, 2017; Kareem, 2017; Eweka, 2017). Their position agrees with the realist security debate which argues that failure and refusal of the State to protect and guarantee the security of its citizens, results in a complete redirection of choices and freedom from the state towards groups and individuals as the foci of security (Abbass, 2005) which explains why victims of such attacks could take up arms in self defense. This fact is further strengthened by comments ascribed to prominent Fulani leaders like senator Kwankwaso, governor El Rufia, Junad Muhammed and

other Muslims who have demonstrated open support by coming out to defend the actions of herdsmen who are part of their ethnic groups, whilst failing to call authorities to institute justice to the aggrieved (Jatto, 2017a; Opejobi, 2017; Eweka, 2017; Olaniyan, 2017).

The question is; why is it that the attackers are usually Muslims and Fulani? Their actions confirm the many concerns expressed across Nigeria Christian communities that some Muslims have the mandate to Islamise Nigeria (Eyoboka, 2017). This wild and retrogressive postulation was recently alluded to and corroborated by eminent statesmen such as; General Theophilus Danjuma, General Joshua Dogonyaro and General Zamani Lekwot who are critical stake holders in Nigeria and elders of the National Christian Elders Forum (NCEF) (Eyoboka, 2017). Also Bishop David Oyedepo and Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) have recently cried out of the intent of Buhari's government to attempt to Islamise Nigeria informed by the patterns of behaviour by state and non-state actors across Nigeria (Obi, 2016; Opejobi, 2017). Partly these claims are underpinned by the fact that Muslim Fulani herdsmen killings have largely gone unchecked and the attempt by Federal Ministry of Education, headed by Alhaji Adamu Adamu a Muslim Fulani Minister, to remove Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) from the Nigerian National Curriculum (Premium Times, 2017; Michaels, 2017) are all case in point.

The paradox is retired military Generals who have come out to agree with these claims are all from Middle Belt North Central states of Nigeria (Eyobaka, 2017) that have naturally supported the far north on many policy issues, therefore demonstrating shift from their traditional generic alliance with northern policy speaks volume (Murray, 2017). Conversely and expected, the Muslim communities, especially from the core north east and north western states led by the Sokoto sultan Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III presiding over an Islamic group called Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI) have refuted the allegations insisting that Muslims were been killed (Premium Times, 2017) but no evidence to support his claims. Thus his assertions become debatable because this man has failed to vehemently defend the many innocent Nigerian Christians whose lives and properties have been destroy by the terrorists Muslim Fulani herdsmen in the past (Murray, 2017; Michaels, 2017). This is partly why pundits conclude that it is an Islamic religious expansionist war and agenda with a view to conquer and dominate Christian territories through intimidation and seizure

of Christian communities with the end goal of obliterating Christianity from Nigeria (Murray, 2017; Odunsi, 2017; Eyobaka, 2017). These views were recently validated by Mr Christopher Smith, Chairman of United States House of Representative Sub-committee on Africa, Global Health, Human rights and International Organisations stressing that Nigeria is indeed the most dangerous place for Christians in the World (Odunsi, 2017; Eyobaka, 2017).

Sequel to the above, evidence of herdsmen attacks against Christian communities does not suggest religious war in Nigeria (Michaels, 2017; Premium Times, 2017). But most of these communities where Muslim Fulani find greener pasture are largely located within the middle belt and southern parts of Nigeria whose sedentary inhabitants are largely Christians and ancestral owners of lands (Jatto, 2017a). However, were settled Muslims and or Fulani groups are situated within such communities, evidence suggest that the observed tendency was for the herdsmen mercenaries to avoid killing such Muslims which is what gives the whole criminal attacks an Islamic Jihadist contour and colouration (Eyobaka, 2017). This deliberate isolation and avoidance of members of Fulani community during attacks was also observed in Fulani attacks across communities in the northwest and northeast which prompted the call by Douglas Murray (2017) for the protection of northern Christians. Further evidence suggests also that even when they did attack Muslims within any community they seldom do so with the same level of viciousness they melted against the Christians (Murray, 2017). Such behavioural patterns recently prompted Chief Mike Ejiofor, a former Director, Directorate of State Security (DSS) to assert that; *“...there is a need to declare a state of emergency in Nigeria. We have crisis in our hands... We must declare emergency in the security sub sector... the greatest of all challenges we have now is the Fulani gunmen”* (Omonobi, 2017; Murray, 2017).

**Table 3: Five Years Summary of Communities more Exposed to Attacks 2012-2016**

STATES			YEAR														
S/N		Communiti	2012			2013			2014			2015			2016		
			Christians	Muslims	Non-Faith	Christian	Muslim	Non-Faith	Christian	Muslim	Non-Faith	Christian	Muslim	Non-Faith	Christian	Muslim	Non-Faith
1.	Abia		2	0	0	4	0	0	6	0	0	3	0	0	7	0	0
2.	Adamawa		3	0	0	3	1	0	3	0	0	5	0	0	9	0	0
3.	Akwa		4	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0

Contemporaneity War Artefacts of Fulani Herdsmen: Mapping Behavioural Footprints, Weapons used and Communities Vulnerable to Attacks in Nigeria

	Ibom															
4.	Anambra	1	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	9	0	0
5.	Bauchi	5	1	0	4	1	0	5	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	0
6.	Bayelsa	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	8	0	0	8	0	0
7.	Benue	5	0	0	11	0	0	73	0	0	7	0	0	14	0	0
8.	Borno	3	1	0	3	0	0	4	0	1	96	1	0	18	1	0
9.	Cross Rivers	4	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	0
10.	Delta	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0
11.	Ebonyi	3	0	0	6	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0
12.	Edo	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2
13.	Ekiti	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	3	0	1
14.	Enugu	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
15.	F.C.T.	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	4	1	2
16.	Gombe	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
17.	Imo	3	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	3	0	0
18.	Jigawa	3	1	0	2	2	0	3	4	0	4	1	0	1	1	0
19.	Kaduna	3	1	0	3	2	0	52	5	1	3	2	0	9	1	0
20.	Kano	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
21.	Katsina	1	1	0	2	4	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	3	0
22.	Kebbi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
23.	Kogi	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	2
24.	Kwara	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
25.	Lagos	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
26.	Nasarawa	2	0	1	2	0	2	3	0	2	3	0	1	3	0	1
27.	Niger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0
28.	Ogun	1	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	1	4	0	1
29.	Ondo	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	1
30.	Osun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
31.	Oyo	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	4	1	0
32.	Plateau	5	0	0	4	0	0	8	0	0	19	0	0	12	0	0
33.	Rivers	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
34.	Sokoto	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
35.	Taraba	2	1	0	2	1	1	13	4	0	4	2	0	5	1	1
36.	Yobe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
37.	Zamfara	3	0	0	0	2	1	0	4	2	1	1	0	6	3	0
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>67</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>


**Sources:** Extracted and compiled by the author from secondary sources; Nigeria News papers, Nigeria Watch/ IFRA-Nigeria, Human Right Watch, Nigeria Weekly Security Report, SB Morgen, Amnesty International, Global Terrorism Index (GTI), and United States -OSAC reports 2012-2016 used in the texts but the data are not exhaustive.

### Data Interpretations and Analysis

Sequel to the above, the researcher was able to measure the communities more vulnerable to attacks informed by raw evidential proofs currently

available in the public domain and variously alluded to by SB Morgen (2016; Human Right Watch, 2014; Murray, 2017). This was calculated based on the numbers of attacks recorded to have been carried out on Christian, Muslim communities including non-faith communities (communities that were not officially recorded as dominated by any of the two main religious groups) from 2012 up to 2016 (Human Right Watch, 2014; Nigeria Weekly Security Report, 2015; SB Morgen, 2016). Table three presents interesting and yet distressing data regarding communities Fulani herdsmen were more likely to attack and the type of violence they were willing to unleash on any community that dares to resist them (2017a; Murray, 2017).


Between 2012 and 2016 their attacks on various communities captured in this survey (Christian, Muslim and Non-faith) have been on the increase except in 2015 and 2016 which witnessed a reduction in their attacks on Christian communities. Despite this observation, the data proves that the Christians were more ferociously attacked than any other communities based on the type of behavioural footprint profiled at the scene of every Christian community attacked and numbers killed in such communities. Whereas there is an arithmetic increase in the attacks on Muslim communities rising from 10 in 2012 to 17 attacks in 2016 and Non-faith communities which also rose from 4 to 14 attacks within the same period, the contrary was the case in Christian communities which witnessed a geometric rise in attacks from 67 to 155. It becomes clearer therefore where their attention lays and the communities they would rather attack at each given opportunity. The evidence provided here suggest that research question three has been answered because the five years summary data has directed the result to which community was more exposed to Fulani herdsmen attacks in contemporary Nigeria.



Accordingly the data revealed on figure five above showed attacks on Christian communities peaked at 201 communities which were in 2014 presenting (30%) of the total Christian communities attacked within the five years under consideration. This is attributed to the fact that President Jonathan's regime was preparing for the 2015 general elections and obviously Christians were first in the firing line within the wider scope of Boko Haram Jihad and tacitly supported by Fulani herdsmen to decimate the Christians. However, this strategy did not quite work because both Christians and Muslims along with members of other faith voted massively for President Jonathan who was defeated in the elections (Max, 2015). Furthermore, the result suggests that out of the total of 80 frequencies of attacks across Nigeria in 2012 67 were directed against Christian communities 10 against Muslim and 4 against non-faith communities (Jatto, 2017a). Furthermore between the five years under review 2015 witnessed frequency of 182 attacks whilst 2016 witnessed frequency of 155 attacks on Christian communities representing 20% and 23% of the gross total of 680 Christian communities attacked in five years (Jatto, 2017a). Also, the result shows that though attacks on Muslim communities witnessed steady increase, it peaked at a combined five years total of 86 Muslim communities broken down to 10(12%) in 2012, 17(20%) in 2013 and 28(33%) communities in 2014. However, it fell to 14(16.28%) in 2015 and but rose to 17(20%) in 2016. Instructively those Muslims attacked were not of the Fulani ethnic group, but mostly those perceived to be Hausa, southerners and those Muslims who may have resisted them like what was observed in Sokoto in 2016 (Jatto, 2017a). The non-faith communities' are attacks the government and independent media and researchers did not associate with any dominant

faith which was put at about 41 communities within five years under review. The lowest was 4(10%) in 2012 which rose to 10(24.30%) non-faith communities but fell slightly to 7(19.07%) in 2015 only to rise to 14(34.15%) non faith communities attacked in 2016.

Figure 6: Percentage Number of Times Each Community was Attacked 2012-2016



Underpinned by the results shown earlier, figure six summarises that within five years a combined total of 807 communities were attacked by the Fulani herdsmen across Nigeria and of this 680 were Christian communities representing 84% of the gross total whilst Muslim communities was 86 communities representing 11% of the gross total and the lowest was non-faith communities with 41 attacks representing 5%. Therefore, it can be asserted that the Fulani herdsmen were more likely to attack Christian communities than any other as shown above and consistent with what they have done across Nigerian in the last five years 2012-2016 under review consistent with different scholarly postulations (Murray, 2017; Omonobi, 2017; Odunsi, 2017).

### Implications of Findings

The general findings reveal mixed implications suggesting partly that whilst the herdsmen rely mostly on using their cultural artefacts because they are more flexible for them to use, they also deploy good amount of modern fire power. Thus the relevant Nigerian security agencies can easily trace the perpetrators of these crimes through mapping the weapon profiles. Also, the result implies that although the Fulani herdsmen demonstrated certain unique attitude and savagery in the theatre of attacks which now represents their behavioural footprint, it points to the fact that relevant security agencies in Nigeria can trace these because of the physical behavioural traits left during

attacks and these are clearly documented in the public domain. The fear is that failure to urgently address these phenomena in Nigeria could lead the country towards an uphill security struggle. Furthermore, the findings agree with the conclusions of Mr Christopher Smith, stating that Nigeria is indeed the most dangerous place for Christians in the World (Odunsi, 2017).

This conclusion is based on the Boko Haram targeting of churches, at first and, recently the Muslim Fulani herdsmen who have also targeted Christians across the country as the data and results above revealed. The deliberate demonstration of ineptitude, by both President Buhari and the Muslim Fulani populated security agencies across Nigeria speaks volume and has cast doubts in the minds of many victims who believe that it is a clandestine Fulani territorial expansionist agenda backed on the largely controlled Fulani government (Barkindo, 2016; Akinwotu, 2016). For instance the herdsmen, it is reported, have completely occupied Abiam Koya, Nyakoo, Mkpikpa and many more communities in Makurdi after killing and driving the remaining sedentary villagers away between February and March 2016 (Duru, 2016). This is further buttressed by the actions of Kaduna State governor, El Rufia, who recently admitted paying compensation to Fulani herdsmen who killed innocence people across many Christian dominated communities in Southern Kaduna state (Akinwotu, 2016; Jatto, 2017a). What is troubling is that these illegal Fulani herdsmen occupants are yet to be evacuated nor has El Rufia, the Kaduna state Governor, made any attempt to return the lands to the ancestral rural farmers or prosecute any culprits (Jatto, 2017a; Akinwotu, 2016; Duru, 2016). This particular implication aligns with the assertions of pro-Christian pundits who argued that Fulani attacks and occupation was an Islamic expansionist agenda (Murray, 2017; Graef, 2015; p.63; Ahema, 2015; Barkindo, 2016).

Despite all these atrocities some sympathisers such as Akinwotu (2016) and Jatto (2017) argued in his book; *“Adopting Sub-regional Sustainable Construction Approaches in Fostering Human Security in Sub-Saharan Africa”* posited that the Fulani herdsmen were responding to worsening nature of draught spreading across the Northern States of Nigeria. This may partly agree with the positivist criminology school debate on criminal attitude which asserts that criminal behaviours was due partly or completely to factors outside the control of individuals suggesting that emerging environmental realities around the herdsmen could have contributed to their criminal killings (Maahs and Vito,



2012). As this debate rages on, it is worthy of note to mention that the devastating draught across southern Africa countries, where herders also experienced hard times accessing grazing pasture, has not resulted in any such barbaric killings and maiming of innocent people or forceful takeover of ancestral lands belonging to sedentary villagers like observed in Nigeria (Murray, 2017; Lamble, 2016; UN-OCHA, 2016). These outcomes answers research question three which evidentially proves that a conclusive pattern could be established that identifies the communities that have been more exposed to Fulani herdsman attacks in Nigeria. However, the overall findings challenges the assertions of realist security debate which argued that security was broadly anchored on the maximisation of military power primarily by the state as demonstrated in its ability to develop strong internal and external defense defined by its military arsenal (Barnett, 2001; Banlaoi, 2010). But this is skewed against the current realities in contemporary Nigeria security dynamics.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Nigerian Army must not be peopled or ethicised with a particular ethnic group because it portends potential grievous security risk were such officers would perceive justice as not to haunt down members of their own ethnic communities.
- Strategic positions across security agencies should and must be shared equally representing the main ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria as this would keep everybody/officer in check and to a large extent encourage National patriotism.
- The Federal Government should, as a matter of urgency, pay compensation to individuals, communities including families of those murdered by Fulani herdsman and their ancestral lands returned back to them so there will be sincere forgiveness otherwise the evil day for a possible catastrophic reprisal against the Fulani is only just been postponed.

## CONCLUSION

Instructively, security is a problem in current day Nigeria thus exposing the precarious position of the skewed collective state of human and property security architecture. This paper has examined a structured process of mapping

the weapons, profiled consistent behavioural footprints and mapped common elements that determine communities exposed to Fulani herdsmen attacks in the last five years (2012 to 2016) in Nigeria. Though three forms of weapons were commonly used by the Fulani herdsmen, they preferred their traditional artefact weapons which allowed them to flexibly carve out living fetus from their mothers' wombs and at other times use modern fire power to ensure mass killing. The statistics revealed in this paper, though not exhaustive, gives details of the behavioural patterns they are known with like vicious and merciless behaviours in the theatre of any crime scene. They violate and denigrate the very essence of human dignity, attack economic resources including properties which are all determined by timing, target people and region or place. The Christian communities were more on the receiving side especially since 2014 to date for many reasons such as; initially desiring to get President Jonathan out of office, migrate down middle belt and southern Nigeria which are considered as part of ploy to Islamise Nigeria (Ahema, 2015; Michaels, 2017; Opejobi, 2017; Eyoboka, 2017). The grim reality is that Nigeria, as we current know it, is sitting on multiple drums of gun powder, once echoed by incumbent President, General Buhari and former President General Obasanjo (Ogbeche, 2016; Agande and Binniyat, 2014), the question to ask therefore is what roles did both of them play in bringing Nigeria to this state? This is debatable.

Indeed and true on many fronts, the urgency of why the federal government must undertake political, economical and most of all security restructuring of the country to douse the current growing calls for separation sweeping through the land as argued by Soyombo (2017) is germane. Although Cook (2011) recalls that the call for the separation and splitting of Nigeria was not new because it was first advanced by the British themselves just before 1960 "*when they agonized over the question of whether the country should be split into two parts of a Christian South and a Muslim North*". Arguably, due to obvious political and economic gains Nigerian nationalists then pressed Britain for a full union (Cook, 2011). This revelation agrees with Soyombo (2017) assertions that the current secessionist clamours should be blamed squarely on the doorsteps of past and present inept leadership of the country. It is clearer now that either splitting or restructuring of Nigeria should be done because injustices fuelled by ethnic alignment and affiliations has destroyed virtually every thread that holds the fabric of national cohesion and patriotism together (Jatto, 2017a; Cook, 2011; Ochayi *et al.*, 2017). This lacuna has particularly been demonstrated

in the abysmal failure by officers and men of relevant security agencies in bringing violent perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice in Nigeria (Ochayi *et al.*, 2017; Cook, 2011).

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