Optimising Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Nigeria
Ambe Alfred N.
Department of Accounting
Gombe State University
Email: ambeneba@gsu.edu.ng
ABSTRACT
Each level of government within each sphere of responsibility should exercise independent authority, such that it is clear that the fiscal policies adopted by one level of government are not limited to or conditional upon the fiscal policies adopted by another level of government. This principle behind classical fiscal federalism has been inundated by a complex of foundational and operational difficulties. These have underlined the quest for optimizing fiscal matters among levels of government. Yet the central government ever so often becomes preponderous in the attempt to create and articulate institutions and cooperations that lead to optimum. This act in itself has skewed fiscal intergovernmental relations in favour of the centre. This work investigates the attempt at optimising fiscal relations in federal systems of government, using Nigeria as the case. The work observes that it is not optimal for one level of government to provide national and local public goods and at the same time be responsible for the distribution and stabilization functions of government; and that an attempt by central government to supply local public goods is an attempt to make uniform what is practically not uniform. It therefore, concludes that scientific operation (implementation) of fiscal relation should be undertaken in the polity; corruption should be tackled in all its forms and that centralizing tendencies should be checked as a way of administratively keeping the optimizing goal within reach. Keywords: Optimisation; Fiscal relations; Fiscal Federalism. Corrupt Implementation.
